I. Prologue

Imagine living in Philadelphia during the early days of the Civil War and reading the latest issue of the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. A front page story reveals a strange and alarming tale: Harbor police have captured a partially-submerged, cigar-shaped “infernal machine” moving slowly down the Delaware River.

This submarine was the creation of inventor, Brutus De Villeroi, who had moved to America in 1859. A native of Tours, DeVilleroi had spent much of his adult career in Nantes, working as a mathematics teacher and part-time inventor. One of the devices he had developed in France was a small submarine that could be a support platform for hard hat divers. He built one which was tested in a bay on the west of France. Although the French Navy was not interested in the concept, De Villeroi was not deterred.

Among his students was Jules Verne, who would write about the fantastic voyages of the submarine, Nautilus in the book Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea. Considering that DeVilleroi had named an earlier undersea prototype Nautilis, it is not farfetched to surmise that the inventor had been a strong influence on young Verne’s imagination.

Ostensibly in Philadelphia to work at exporting anthracite coal to France, DeVilleroi interested some insurance backers in the concept of using a boat similar to the one he built in France to search for and salvage the gold, including that from wrecks of the De Braake and the Central America. He was testing his small salvage submarine in the Delaware River when the police took notice.

The Philadelphia police, acting on nervous reports of strange goings-on at the waterfront, arrested De Villeroi and some of his workmen. They also impounded the curious iron tube, which measured some 33 feet long and about five feet in diameter. De Villeroi had tested the device in the Delaware and was going to use it as both a mobile diver lockout chamber and salvage platform.

Needless to say, the police had no idea what this tube was but they knew it needed to put under Naval control. They contacted Captain Samuel F. DuPont, commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. In response, CAPT DuPont appointed three officers to examine the device, interview the inventor and report their findings. Whether by design or not, De Villeroi succeeded, by November 1861, in signing a contract with the Navy to build the Union’s first submarine.

The three officers chosen by DuPont were ideally qualified to inspect DeVilleroi’s novel underwater vessel. The senior officer was Commander Henry K. Hoff of the shipyard staff and an expert in ship design. As second officer, Commander Charles Steedman was an expert in naval warfare. The third officer, Robert Danby, was an eminent naval engineer. After completing their examination, the three submitted their report on the 7th of July.

The Hoff commission reported De Villeroi's submarine was operational and seemed to be a successful venture. They noted that the vessel was screw-propelled and resembled a whale in form. The officers also singled-out four distinctive operational characteristics of the submarine: 1) the ability to remain submerged for a length of time without exposing anything to the outside air, 2) the ability to sink and be raised at will, 3) the ability of a man to leave and return to the vessel while both remained submerged and lastly, and 4) the ability of a man to survive outside the submarine while submerged by breathing through an air tube connected to the inside of the boat.

While the Hoff Report was being filtered upward through various Navy bureaus, De Villeroi sent letters describing the invention to both Secretary of the Navy Welles and President Lincoln. His letter to Lincoln was forwarded to the Navy Department. In response to his correspondence from DeVilleroi, Welles ordered Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, to report on the submarine. Smith informed Welles that the Hoff report had reflected favorably on the vessel but that, in her present configuration, was too small to be readily tested as a weapon. In response, Smith recommended that a larger version be built on a "no payment for failure" basis.

With the assistance of a Philadelphia businessman, Martin Thomas, a contract to build a new submarine was drawn up among a trio of interested parties: De Villeroi, Thomas and a group of financial backers, and the US Navy itself. Located in the National Archives, the contract for construction of the Alligator underscores the Navy’s intention for the vessel as well as a tantalizing "secret."

In case the said de Villeroi shall perform valuable services with said propeller for the United States by the destruction of an enemy's ship or vessel by direction of the Secretary of the Navy and to his satisfaction, then the government of the United States shall pay to the party of the first part a further sum of eighty six thousand dollars ($86,000) subject to and appropriated by Congress.

The secret of said invention shall be divulged by the inventor, M. de Villeroi, under his solemn oath or affirmation in a written paper subscribed by him to be sealed and deposited with the Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks, with the certificate thereon of Mr. W.L. Hirst that he has carefully examined the paper an firmly believes it to be of the secret of said invention, not to be opened until after the payment of said eighty six thousand dollars, or the death, disability or dereliction of duty of the inventor shall occur.

The said invention shall not be used by or the secret divulged to any government, power or individual without the consent in writing of both parties to this agreement.

This began the very beginning of the US Naval Submarine Force, a technological wonder akin to other great maritime advances of the Civil War era, including the well-known ironclad USS Monitor, and the recently-raised Confederate submarine, CSS Hunley.

II. The Alligator Comes to Life

Construction of the vessel began immediately at the Neafie and Levy Shipyard, in the Kensington section of Philadelphia. Although the Navy had specified that the submarine’s construction take no more than 40 days at a cost of $14,000, the project would suffer long delays.

Although de Villeroi wrote in a December 7^th letter to Commodore Smith that the vessel was "almost entirely finished,” he nevertheless emphasized that the construction time would need to be extended in order to finish "delicate pieces of the interior.” He also noted the vessel was entirely different than anything that the yard had built before and, therefore, it was scarcely possible for the contractor to truly appreciate how long it would take took to build the boat. DeVilleroi added that the contractor (Thomas) had not scheduled things properly. The seeds of disagreement were thus sown, guaranteeing a disruption of building process.

Neafie and Levy were expert in building boilers and marine engines and were shipbuilders of smaller tugs. Accordingly, they could easily build the submarine’s main structure and propulsion system. Contrary to de Villeroi’s contention in his letter to Smith, the vessel’s internal workings were not overly complex. A case could be made that the Frenchman was attempting to further delay the project in order to cut out Thomas and his backers from the project.

Enter Mr. William L. Hirst. A Philadelphia lawyer, Hirst was conversant in French and acted as a communication link between De Villeroi, Thomas and Commodore Smith. Commodore Smith granted a fifteen day extension on 10 December 1861, the date the boat was to be finished. On the 20th, Smith received word that the "secrets" were in Hirst's possession and locked in his safe. Smith’s hard stand on finishing the ship was based, at least in part, on his own deadline. Norfolk had fallen and word of the conversion of the USS Merrimac into the CSS Virginia had reached Washington. In his letter to de Villeroi, Smith noted that any contract scheduling difficulties were "no fault of mine."

The letter passed on from Hirst to the Bureau asking for another 14 days to finish the work. At about the same time, the inventor wrote to Smith, claiming that the delays were entirely the fault of the contractor (Thomas) in that money was not forthcoming to allow work at night and on weekends. De Villeroi further stated that a crew needed to be hired soon so they could be trained. At the end of the letter, de Villeroi recommended to the Commodore that the two of them correspond directly, not through the contractor, to resolve any remaining problems.

Commodore Smith wrote de Villeroi a letter on 3 January 1862 that spelled out the facts of bureaucratic life. He said he would be happy to correspond but "as for the contract, the Department knows no one but the contractor". He also informed the inventor that because of the delays and evident problems, the ship would not be consider received until it had been well and fully tested and was considered by the Navy to be in all respects.

The second extension passed and the boat was still not finished. It appears that there were some things the inventor wanted for the boat that Thomas had not provided and these were needed to produce the "secrets" alluded to in the contract. From the existing records, it seems that the secrets related to a form of air purification system and a type of battery. The air purification system would be of great use in allowing the submarine to stay submerged. The usefulness of the battery is somewhat a mystery. One conjecture is that is would be used to detonate mines or charges laid by the divers.

De Villeroi wrote to Smith on the 18th of January stating magnanimously that his payment for work on the submarine would be "the glory and successful completion of the work". He went on to say that "after taking on the ballast of lead and some pieces of platina which have not been furnished me" the work would be finished. Because the completion date and the extensions had passed, he once again recommended that he and Smith henceforth communicate directly with each other: "Now that you have done away with the contractor...business ought to be between the government and the inventor."

On the 22nd of January, Smith brusquely informed the inventor that no further money would be forthcoming until the boat was finished and tested. He added that the government still knew no one but the contractor with respect to the boat. A week later, Smith sent Thomas an ultimatum: If the boat was not finished and ready to be shipped aboard the USS Rhode Island in three or four days, the time for using the submarine would have passed. He stated "the Merrimac is out of dock and ready for trial at Norfolk".

The submarine was reported ready for launch on the 29th of January but according to Thomas, some of the oars that were to be used for propulsion had to be reworked, thereby further delaying the launch. At about the same time, de Villeroi wrote to Smith that the latest delay was due to ice on the river. In the meantime, the boat was being painted, green outside and white inside.

February arrived and the boat was still not complete. Commodore Smith was getting discouraged with the progress of the project and was becoming more and more concerned with the threat posed by the CSS Virginia. A letter to de Villeroi on February first showed suggests that, while Smith had little faith in the usefulness of the boat, he still felt it warranted a trial. Smith made a tactical error in the letter. De Villeroi had been asking Thomas for things to finish the boat. He needed the plates of platina, explosives and other items. In his letter of the first of February, Smith told de Villeroi that the contractor (Thomas) was to furnish everything de Villeroi needed to finish the submarine. De Villeroi immediately wrote back that there was a list of things which were required but had not been supplied and were holding up completion of the boat. These included explosives, two hydraulic jacks, platina, a telescope which could give distances (an invention of de Villeroi's which had not been patented or proven to work) and a chest of tools. In that letter, he complained of an entire litany of thing that Thomas had done or not done. These included having what de Villeroi termed "unethical" discussions about his inventions with scientists, not spending enough money to complete the work in a timely manner. The cost of the project, he said, was very much less than the $14,000 allowed for by the contract. He felt that the boat should be taken by the Navy for completion to keep it safe from harm as he intimated there had been threats against the boat.

Before this letter had reached the Bureau, Smith informed Thomas that the terms of the contract had not been met and the boat would not be received by the Department until "such time as further opportunities avail themselves" at which time the contract would have to be re negotiated. De Villeroi, upon hearing of this development, rushed a letter to Smith saying that he (de Villeroi) was still employed by the government and entitled to pay until such a time as the Navy Department suspended his nomination as engineer of the work.

Smith shot back that the relationship between Thomas, de Villeroi and the Navy Department was "unique”. Smith wrote that "the time has elapsed for the completion of the boat and the contract is forfeited. You now decline, as I learn, to give certificate of the completion of the boat because the contractor demurs to furnishing a quantity of costly material which the chemists say is unnecessary." The he lowered the boom. "Therefore work and superintending is stopped and will remain so until you and Mr. Thomas come to terms....If the contractor will deliver the boat in 10 days complete and with your certificate and you and your crew will be there, the government will test the efficiency and if she proves satisfactory, payment will be made." ... "Until there is compliance with these terms, the Department will...consider the bargain as closed.

Hirst initiated a flurry of correspondence between Thomas and de Villeroi. They came to terms on everything but the platina for the battery. The problem was not whether they were necessary, but what size they were to be. Then, to complicate matters, de Villeroi went into seclusion. Thomas tried to placate de Villeroi by sending him money to get the plates that Thomas could not find. De Villeroi wrote a letter to Smith saying that he considered the money insulting and an "insidious proposition". He then wrote Lincoln still trying to cling to a fast vanishing hope that he could receive the honors for the boat. He said "(I) haven't received a commission as yet as commander of the Propeller - I would be happy to receive it from you". No reply to this letter has, as yet, been located.

Thomas reported to Smith that attempts to resolve the problems had been unsuccessful. Smith replied that he regretted the matter had become so complicated by the terms of the contract had not been met thus the contract was forfeit. Hirst asked if there weren't some way to salvage the project. Smith sent Captain Davis of his staff to discuss the problems with the parties and attempt to resolve the impasse. De Villeroi would not meet with Davis.

In objecting to certain changes to his plans for the vessel’s construction, de Villeroi effectively exited himself from the process and was later officially dismissed as supervisor.

On May 1, 1862, the new submarine was launched. Forty-seven feet long, painted green, and propelled by rows of oars on both sides, the vessel quickly became known as the Alligator by virtue of the reptile it resembled. About a month after its launch, she was towed to Hampton Roads, Virginia. Her first missions: to destroy a strategically important bridge across the Appomattox River and to clear away obstructions in the James River. When the Alligator arrived at the James River, with civilian Samuel Eakins in charge, a fierce battle was being waged in the area. Because neither the James nor the Appomattox was deep enough to permit the vessel to submerge, it was feared that even a partially visible submarine would be vulnerable to seizure by the Confederates. The Alligator was sent to the Washington Navy Yard, for further experimentation and testing.

III. Reconfiguration

In August 1862, LT Thomas O. Selfridge accepted command of the submarine, after being promised promotion to captain if he and the Alligator’s new crew destroyed the new Confederate ironclad, the Virginia II. During test runs in the Potomac, the Alligator proved to be underpowered and unwieldy. During one particular trial, the sub’s air quickly grew foul, the crew panicked, and all tried to get out of the same hatch at the same time--prompting Selfridge to call the whole enterprise “a failure.” He and his crew were reassigned and the vessel was sent to dry dock for extensive conversion. The dream of using this “secret weapon” against the Virginia II was scrapped.

Over the next six months, the Alligator’s system of oars was replaced by a screw propeller. In early spring 1863, President Lincoln observed a demonstration of the “improved” vessel. Shortly thereafter, RADM S. P. Lee ordered the Alligator, once again commanded by Eakins, be towed to Port Royal and under the control of RADM Samuel DuPont, Commanding the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, to participate in the capture of Charleston.

IV. An Early Demise

Towed by the USS Sumpter, the unmanned Alligator left Washington for Port Royal on March 31, 1863 to take part of the planed attack on Charleston. On April 2^nd, a fierce storm forced the crew of the endangered Sumpter to cut the submarine adrift, somewhere off the Cape Hatteras coast. According to reports sent to Secretary of the Navy Welles, the Alligator was “lost” at sea.

According to an April 9^th, 1963 letter sent from the Sumpter's Acting Master, Winchester, to Secretary Welles, the Alligator was cut loose at 6:00 pm at a point where the sea may be as deep as 9,000 feet.

V. Fast Forward

Over the next hundred forty years several articles were written about the Alligator and her history. US Naval Institute Proceedings carried and article in the 1930's by Louis Bollander. There were articles in All Hands, Civil War Times Illustrated, and others. Mark Ragan's book on Civil War submarine warfare covered not only the Alligator but all the other efforts during the period. However the little boat's story garnered little interest. Then in May 2002 Chief of Naval Research RADM Jay Cohen, Daniel J. Basta, director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP), and Institute for Exploration Founder and President Dr. Robert Ballard discuss a magazine article, first noticed by Mrs. Cohen, about the Civil War-era U.S. Navy (USN) submarine USS Alligator -- a vessel that history has all but forgotten and about which little is known. A month later RADM Jay Cohen, initiates a historical research project, to glean background information on the Alligator. Preliminary research is conducted by two University of Virginia interns, supervised by CAPT Woody Berzins of ONR’s Public Affairs Office. CDR Richard Poole of ONR led an intensive research effort. In addition to conducting document searches at the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and the Naval Historical Center, CDR Poole identified and enlisted the help of various individuals who had already written about the Alligator, including Jim Christley EMCS(SS), USN (Ret.) and Mark K. Ragan. From the National Archives alone, CDR Poole and Mr. Christley identify over 200 letters and other documents relating to the planning, construction and deployment of the Alligator. Among these documents is a letter dated 09 Apr 1863 from U.S.S. Sumpter from Acting Master J. Winchester to the Secretary of the Navy describing in detail the conditions that forced the crew of the towing vessel to cut the Alligator loose off the coast of Cape Hatteras, N.C. as she was being towed to Charleston, South Carolina.

CAPT Berzins and CDR Poole conferred with NMSP Senior Archaeologist Bruce Terrell, LTJG Jeremy Weirich and CAPT Craig McLean of NOAA’s Office of Ocean who prepared a chart to indicate where the submarine may have gone down. In early November 2002, at the urging of NMSP Director Dan Basta, U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) instructor LCDR Michiko Martin, USN, organized interdisciplinary team of USNA midshipmen researchers to investigate the loss of the USS Alligator. On the 25^th of November, 2002 the first meeting of a “steering committee” to conduct preliminary planning for further investigation into the Alligator was held at ONR. At the meeting, Admiral Cohen declared his intention of co-sponsoring an education symposium on the Alligator.

In the early part of the next year, under the direction of Michiko Martin, now with NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program, and USNA Professor Peter Guth, a team of midshipmen conducted independent research on the USS Alligator.

A second, much larger steering committee meeting was held at ONR in April 2003 and at a formal meeting on April 28, 2003 at the Naval Academy, the four midshipmen researchers presented the results of their research.

A search for Alligator-related documents led Catherine Marzin of NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program, while on a vacation to France, visit the Service Historique de la Marine (SHM) naval historical archive in Vincennes, France, where she obtains copies of original letters and drawings drafted by the Alligator’s inventor, Brutus de Villeroi, the only plans of the Alligator known to exist.

In the summer of 2003, funded by the Office of Naval Research and managed by NMSP and NOAA’s Office of Ocean Exploration, a 50-hour research cruise is conducted on NOAA’s R/V Littlehales (now Thomas Jefferson) to examine areas near the possible sinking location and identify possible points of interest. ONR and NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program sponsor a well-received USS Alligator exhibit at the Navy Submarine League’s Annual Symposium.

ONR and NOAA held a large symposium on the USS Alligator at the Historic Ship Nautilus and Submarine Force Museum in Groton, Connecticut on October 17, 2003. The symposium brought together naval historians, maritime archaeologists, marine resource managers, oceanographers, artists, documentary filmmakers, and ocean explorers to share information and new findings about the Alligator.

Research continues with volunteers from ONR, NOAA and the civilian community, including the Navy and Marine Living History Association, exerting their particular talents to uncover and assemble all the information that exists on the little submarine and the people who built and operated her. Several news organizations and National Public Radio have carried the story of the Alligator and the search for her final resting place. As a result of these stories, some of the descendants of the first commander of the boat, Samuel Eakin have come forward. Their recollections of Acting Master Eakin help paint a more complete picture of the submarine and the events surrounding her life and demise.

The search for the USS Alligator is a long term project. It is in many ways similar to the Monitor project which resulted in the raising of the turret from that famous vessel last summer. The goals of the project are to learn as much about this pioneer of the United States Naval Submarine Force as possible, and to find her. She may lie in very deep water and be very well preserved. Finding her would then bring the question. Can we bring her up?