The A-Boats, A legend is
born
J.L.Christley
EMCS(SS) USN(ret)
With additional research by Mr. Christopher Wright (President,
International Naval Research Organization)
The A-Boats, A legend is born:
The Navy accepted and commissioned the USS Holland in
October of 1900. It was the first of an
unbroken line of commissioned submarines in the United States Navy. John Holland had already built a follow-on
design, the
The
construction technique was different by a long shot from anything we see
today. Welding was non-existent. Everything had to be either cast into the
desired shape or fabricated from rolled steel which was then either bolted or
riveted together. Welding some angle or
channel iron to build foundations and brackets could be done. Frames of rolled T-stock or Z-stock were
erected about 18 inches apart. These
frames had pre-drilled 3/4" holes around their periphery. Rolled and hammered 1/2" oil tempered
plates some 70 feet long and about 8 feet wide with tapered ends were laid
against the frames and holes marked. The
plates were then drilled with more 3/4' holes to match the holes in the
frames. The plates then were re-laid
along the frames again and the rivets inserted.
The rivets were inserted red-hot from the inside then backed up by a
hefty man with a backing piece. On the
outside, the hammer man either with and air hammer or a hand hammer peaned the
protruding end of the rivet into the countersunk hole in the plate. The plate above was overlapped by nearly a
foot and a double row of rivets spaced about two inches apart hammered properly
to make a pressure-tight seal. Burrs and
rivet heads that protruded too much were filed off, by hand. The work was brutal. These things were started and finished in the
winter-----in
Tank plates assembled at the same time as the hull and its frames were fabricated the same way. Ballast tanks were in the center of the boat and in a saddle shape, the bottom of which was the pressure hull. They carried well past the horizontal centerline on the sides and formed enclosing wings. The tank top was flat and formed a floor for the battery cells. Forward, under the torpedo tube was the gasoline tank. The forward trim tank wrapped around the tube. The after trim tank was under and a part of the foundation for the thrust bearing on the main shaft.
Atop the center of the pressure hull, a large cylindrical casting was inserted. Merely thirty-six inches in diameter, the cylinder was closed at the top by a hatch, twenty-four inches in diameter. This was the conning tower and one of the only two hatches in the boat. The other was over the engine.
The engine was gasoline fueled, four cycle and had four cylinders. But that is where the resemblance to the modern automobile engine ends. The cylinders were about 7 inches in diameter and had a stroke of nearly a foot. The engine could be turned over by hand, by the electric motor or air started. It was started on one cylinder only then as it was turning over the others were cut in by adjusting the fuel and spark. The thing had to be tweaked constantly. It only ran in one direction so backing down was out of the question. There was only a limited speed adjustment. Half speed of about 4 knots and full speed of about 8.5 knots were the choices. It would develop 180 horsepower when running properly. Flanged fittings bolted up with no lockwashers or lockwire, pipe thread with only lead paste to form a gasket, no swage fittings or compression joints, the piping system was a nightmare.
Being gasoline fueled, there was the problem of leaks and fumes. The fumes could build up and cause two problems. First was the obvious fire problem. The fire would be sudden and disastrous. The second problem was the effect of the fumes on the brain. They tended to accumulate low in the ship and caused displacement of the oxygen and slow asphyxia. The symptoms were an euphoria which overcame the crew and impaired their judgment. The next step was fire or death by suffocation. Lubricating oil was splashed into the bearings in the semi-open crankcase and the oil cups were gravity feed and had to be reused by filling the oil cups from a can. The term oiler had real meaning. Working around this engine with all its open moving cams, crankshafts and rods made it a dangerous time to be a machinist.
Aft of the engine on the main shaft was a hand operated band clutch. Next in line was the 70 horsepower open winding DC motor. Powered from the battery, it drove the shaft at some 400 rpm. It was reversible and had some speed control so it was used for maneuvering near the dock. The shaft also drove, through a set of friction clutches, the air compressor and ballast pump. Full speed submerged was seven knots and could be sustained for about four hours.
Nestled inside the wings of the main ballast tanks was the battery. Here was a monster. Admiral Lockwood called it the "Fiery Devil and the Green Death". It was a lead acid battery, lead plates and sulfuric acid as electrolyte. It was the same general type used today. However, there were some significant differences. Today's battery is closed in a hard rubber and plastic cell jar that holds the electrolyte and plates. The electrolyte is stirred by an air lift pump similar to an aquarium's pump. The plates today are specially designed to minimize gassing, and we have good ventilation with accurate hydrogen detectors. None of these were present on the A-boat. The battery cells were steel boxes lined with a layer of rubber and a layer of lead and wedged in place with waxed maple wedges. The boxes were open topped and the plates were hung by extenders on the top of each plate to from the top of the cell jar. The positive plates were connected together with a soldered bus bar of lead coated copper. The negative plates were hung and connected in a similar manner. The cells were then connected in series with intercell connector bars as our batteries are today. The cells were wedged in place in the steel box that was bounded by the ballast tanks and the fore and aft half bulkheads. The box was lined was lined with lead. The top of the battery well was covered by shellacked oak planks about 3 inches thick and 16 inches wide. They stretched from side to side across the well and rested on a lip on each side of the well. The planks, when in place were covered by a rubber sheet then a shellacked canvas walking cover. If any maintenance or monitoring of the battery gravity or temperature had to be done, the planks were taken up then replaced when the readings were done. The cells could be cut out of the circuit and repaired by replacing acid and plates. The space above the cells was ventilated by air leaking down around the planks and drawn off to be exhausted over the side by the battery blowers. There were sixty cells in ten rows of six cells each and they could develop an 1840 amp hour discharge rate for 4 hours. Being a lead acid battery which used a chemical reaction to provide electrical power, the battery had a few other chemical reactions which had to be taken into consideration. First, when being charged, (and to a lesser extent while being discharged at a high rate) the battery generated hydrogen gas. This gas was highly flammable at a four percent concentration in air and explosive at a seven percent concentration. If the battery were improperly charged or improperly ventilated and the concentration could build in a hurry. The results were lethal. This was the Fiery Death.
Another gas generated by the battery was hydrogen sulfide. The rotten egg smell of this gas permeated everything. Then there was chlorine. The battery was in the center of the boat, covered by a deck of loose planks, rubber sheet and canvas. Directly above the deck was the conning tower and the main hatch into the boat. The top of the hatch was three feet above the waterline with the original design and five feet with the later conning tower. Any seawater coming down the hatch fell directly on the battery deck. If any leaked into any of the cells, the sulfuric acid combined with the sodium chloride in the seawater and liberated a pea green, heavier than air, oxygen displacing, toxic gas, the Green Devil, chlorine. If cells became salted, they were charged and discharged while ventilating the boat to get rid of the chlorine then the acid was spiked as necessary.
The battery
was connected to a master switchboard.
Not at all what we are used to even in our worst nightmares. A single three foot wide by four foot high
slab of two inch thick marble, supported by steel angle and channel was mounted
vertically on the starboard (port on some) side of the boat. On this slab were mounted two double pole,
single throw knife switches that were the battery breakers. one for each half
of the battery. Above them was a double
pole, double throw knife switch which could hook the battery halves in series
or parallel. There were separate single
throw single and double throw knife switches for the battery blowers,
auxiliaries and lights. A large double
throw knife switch was the ahead and reverse lever for the main motor. Seven single pole knife switches in a row
were the starting resistance cutout switches.
These starting resistors of german silver were mounted either in a
separate box or on the back of the marble slab.
A motor field switch and motor field rheostat rounded out the list of
items on the switchboard. There were no
other switchboards or distribution boxes.
That was it. It was all open
switches, open wiring.
Up front was a single 18" diameter torpedo tube. The boat could carry one torpedo in the tube and two in the boat on each side of the middle space (where the battery well was). The torpedo man who took care of the torpedoes was a real craftsman. The fish was powered by high pressure air which powered a four cylinder air motor. It was a straight runner, with only a rudimentary (and not very reliable) depth control. Each fish had to have its gyro set up in the shop and tweaked prior to loading. Taking on the torpedo was interesting as it was loaded into the tube then brought into the boat. After each firing, the torpedo had to be recovered even if it meant dragging the bottom then diving to hook on a line. It was then reloaded, dismantled and prepared for another launch.
The crew consisted of one officer, normally an Ensign and six enlisted men. There would be two chiefs, one electrician chief and one machinist chief. A couple machinists, another electrician and a torpedoman would round out the crew. The watches were non-rotating. two tended the engine, one the motor and switchboard, one on the helm, one on the deck with the CO and one cooking, cleaning and generally hanging loose. The steering gear was hand only, as were the stern planes. There were no bow planes. (Note: A-1 had hand hydraulic steering and diving. The operator turned a gear pump which pumped oil to rams attached by linkage to the planes and rudder.)
To submerge the boat was quite an evolution. Lets assume that the boat had just transited to its operating area and the CO decided to dive. First he rang up ALL STOP. The engine was shutdown and the clutch between the engine and motor was disengaged. A couple of men unshipped the two ventilation pipes and struck them below. The masts, if up were taken down (although that was not required). The crew went below, shutting and clamping the conning tower hatch. Still stopped, safety tank was flooded, then the ballast tanks. These tanks had vent valves which vented the air into the interior of the boat. The vents were opened then large kinsgston valves (lever operated valves which shut with sea pressure) were opened and admitted water to the tanks. If the ship was properly ballasted, it should sink until the conning tower upper end was just at the surface.
The CO ordered ahead half speed ahead. The electrician at the switchboard, made sure all the switches for the main motor starting resistance were open, checked the field rheostat at minimum, smartly shut the motor field switch then the motor reverser switch in the ahead position. Then reaching up, he shut each of the starting resistance switches in turn. After the motor comes up to the minimum running speed, the electrician adjusts the motor field rheostat to adjust the speed to the ordered shaft turns. The planesman cranked some up angle on the stern planes to give down angle to the boat. He had to turn the handwheel that was connected to linkage from the middle of the boat to the aft end of the main motor. The gears were attached to a quadrant gear which drove the linkage to the planes and rudder. No power assist. With a little down angle the boat started down. Normally, the boats ran at either 16' depth (measured at about the mid level of the boat) or at 60 feet.
It was not an easy life, but the hardship bonded the crew. Each man had to know all that had to be done and lent a hand when required on any job. Ensign Charles Lockwood, when about to be checked out for final qualification to command the A-2, was introduced to a new concept. The crew had been briefed by the old CO and the Division Commander ahead of time and as Lockwood took the boat down for his qualification dive, all hell broke loose. The boat seemed heavy and there was the sound of rushing water from aft. Someone yelled that they were leaking through the engine exhaust and the bilges were filling. Just then someone else yelled out that they smelled chlorine. The boat took a lurch with an up angle and the lights went out. He ordered the boat to the surface. After the boat leveled out on the surface, and the lights came back on, Lockwood noticed all the crew men had grins on their face and the flooding and chlorine problems seemed to have vanished. The Division CO and the crew had pulled a drill. It was realistic, well rehearsed and a complete surprise. Lockwood did well but was really upset by what he felt was a trick played by the crew. When it was explained that this was a way to demonstrate he could handle the boat, and that he had done well, thus earning the respect and trust of the crew, he felt much different. The tradition of casualty drills has been an integral part of the submarine force since the earliest boats.
The class
was built from plans of the Electric Boat Company. The plans were John Holland's seventh, the
sixth being the
Adder and
her sisters were built and from their commissioning until 1908 taught the Navy
much about the submarine and its capabilities. Formed into an operational
flotilla in
The boats
were stripped down and loaded aboard colliers to make the trip. Porpoise and Shark were first. They went aboard the USS Caesar (AC-16). Loading in
The
following year, Caesar made another trip carrying the Adder and the
Moccasin. In late 1912, the USS Ajax
(AC-15) carried two of the B Class (B-2 and B-3) to
These boats escorted ships into and our of Manila during WWI and performed the tasks of a "Fleet in being" that is one whose presence deters an opponent even if it makes no patrols and sinks none of its foes. After the war, they were worn out and used up. By 1918 the S-boats were being built. As far a leap in 18 years as we made in the period from 1945 to 1963 when the diesel boats were being replaced by the nukes. The Adders were put out of commission for the last time. They stayed anchored and alongside until 1922. The Navy designated them as targets and they were towed to a position west of Corregidore and sunk over a period of time by gunfire of destroyers. As near as we can find out at present, they are still there.
The A-boats were the first in many ways. In one, however, they showed the way the submarine force would be. Ensign Lockwood was most disappointed to be assigned to the USS Monterey for duty in submarines. He was told by some of the officers already there that the submarine would get in your blood and soon either you wouldn't be around or you wouldn't trade the boat for duty on anything else. He discovered within six months that they were right. The man who was Commander Submarine Force Pacific during the last three years of World War II was never the same. It would be the same for many of us.
In 2002 I posted a question to the membership of the International
Naval Research Organization. I asked if
anyone had an information as to the location and
circumstances of the sinking as targets of the A and B class submarines in
QUESTION 40/02 see W.I. No.4, 2002 page 337.
The need
for submarines to provide for local harbor defense at “
The
Secretary of the Navy’s office referred the General Board recommendation to the
Bureau of Construction and Repair on 1 July for consideration of the practical
issues involved in sending these small craft out to East Asian waters. The bureau reported back on 10 August,
allowing that torpedo boats could be sent out once they were put in a
“thoroughly efficient condition as to both hull and machinery.” The bureau considered, however, that it was
“impracticable” to transport or tow submarines “for so great an over-sea
journey as that involved in taking them to the
In the meantime, the Secretary of the Navy asked the Board of Inspection and Survey on 30 June to determine which five boats on the Atlantic coast might be in adequate condition to be sent to the Asiatic station. After clarifying its understanding of the task on 7 July, the survey board reported back to the Navy Department on 1 August. The Board’s findings were discouraging, for it considered that none of the five boats in question “can be properly considered suitable”. The five “most suitable” were the Porter, DuPont, Barney, Bagley, and Biddle. The board further recommended that the Navy Yards carefully examine the condition of the hulls and machinery of these vessels, and that they be evaluated locally over two months’ time prior to deployment.
After considering the Bureau of Construction
and Repair’s views, acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Darling directed on 18
August that six DuPont class torpedo boats be sent to the
The
Secretary of the Navy then directed the Commandant, Norfolk Navy Yard, on 19
September 1904, to overhaul the five previously named vessels and prepare them
for deployment with provisions for towing under open ocean conditions. Inspections of the craft showed that they
were not well suited for the planned deployment, however. Naval Constructor Robert Stocker at
Submarines for the Asiatic Fleet. Instead, some nine submarines, all but one of
the first two series production classes in the fleet, were transported out to
the Philippines as deck cargo in four separate lifts during 1908-1915. The submarines were based at Cavite Navy
Yard, a small facility inside
The submarines spent virtually all
their time in the
During the World War I years, the
submarines based at
Retirement and Disposal of the Submarines. A-4 was the first submarine to be inactivated, being placed in commission in ordinary (a form of reduced commission, with a greatly reduced personnel strength assigned) by the beginning of 1918.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, ordered on 28 December 1917 that A-3 be placed in commission in ordinary. A-3 was placed in commission in ordinary on 16 February 1918. As of this date, the machinery plant still was in good condition, and the storage batteries entirely removed, cleaned, and prepared for restoration to service. All tanks were emptied except the main ballast and after main ballast tanks, which were filled with water. A-3 conducted some local operations during fall 1918, possibly placed in operational service temporarily with personnel from other submarines. The vessel apparently was returned to full commission by early 1919.
A-6 subsequently was placed in commission in ordinary on 30 November 1918. Unlike A-3, however, A-6 was not ready for early reactivation. The vessel’s report of inactivation, dated 30 November 1918, reported that the storage batteries were in poor condition: “The batteries of this vessel have seen more than four years of constant service and are worn out. It was due to the condition of the batteries that this vessel was placed in commission in ordinary.” A-7 also was placed in commission in ordinary by October 1918, apparently in view of engineering problems.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directed early in 1919 that all remaining active submarines except B-1 be placed in commission in ordinary immediately. B-1 was to continue in full commission. The Commandant, Naval Stations Cavite and Olongapo, passed this instruction on 5 March 1919 to the submarine division commander.
A-2 accordingly was placed in commission in ordinary on 6 March 1919. The commanding officer’s final report upon inactivation noted that the storage batteries were in bad condition and was “as a whole…entirely worn out”. Some of the battery plates had been in use for nine years. The main engines were considered to be in only fair condition, with pistons and rings in need of overhaul. The hull, on the other hand, was evaluated as being in “excellent condition and shows but little deterioration due to the age of this vessel.” The vessel’s assigned crew while in ordinary comprised one gunner’s mate, one machinst’s mate, and one electrician. Similar letter reports of the inactivation at this time of the other vessels—A-3, A-5, B-2, and B-3—have not been researched but the flotilla’s weekly report of operations dated 7 March 1919 records that these four other vessels also were placed in commission in ordinary on 6 March 1919.
The Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter on 11 November 1919 to the Chief, Bureau of Navigation, directing that the bureau issue the necessary instructions to place A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-3 out of commission. OpNav followed up with a letter dated 12 November 1919 to the three material bureaus (C&R, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance) reporting that submarines A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-2 “have been ordered placed out of commission”. The same letter noted that submarines A-3, A-5, and B-3 were in commission in ordinary and that G-1 [B-1 was meant] was in full commission. The letter stated that “it is intended to continue these four vessels in service until other submarines arrive on that station.” Naval Station Cavite duly reported to the Navy Department by message dated 12 December 1919 that A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-2 had been placed out of commission that day.
The Commandant, Cavite Navy Yard, formed a special board to inspect the five submarines placed out of commission. The board submitted a report dated 11 December 1919. The vessels all were laid up with “all special precautions for the safety, care, and preservation of the hull, engines, and auxiliaries…taken.” The board found that the vessels’ engines were in “fair condition, though in need of overhaul and adjustment”, with the exception of A-7. The report stated that “the cylinders on the A-7 are slightly scored, piston rings are badly worn, and bearings are in need of adjustment. The shaft is out of alignment and clutch is in need of repairs and general overhaul of engine is necessary.”
The Navy Department directed on 26 December 1919 that the five submarines slated for inactivation—A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-3—be offered for sale “as the cost of repairs and upkeep is disproportionate to their value to the Navy”. The Bureau of Navigation was directed to prepare orders to strike these vessels from the Navy Register “upon receipt of the notice of their sale”. Accordingly, they were placed on sale as they lay at Cavite Navy Yard. The Board of Inspection and Survey provided the Secretary of the Navy with a memorandum dated 18 August 1919, identifying the assessed sale value of the craft as scrap. The “A” class boats each were assessed as being worth $1000; the somewhat larger B-3 was appraised at $1200. The Bureau of Navigation sent a memorandum on 26 May 1920 to the Solicitor, reporting that “this date issued the necessary orders striking the above named submarines from the Navy Register”. (If consistent with the Department’s 26 December guidance, however, these “necessary orders” remained in abeyance until authoritative evidence of successful sale was in hand.)
Acting Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt sent a message on 1 June 1920 to the Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, directing that the five submarines be advertised and sold. The Navy Department in turn requested on 11 June 1920 that the President approve the sale of the vessels within 30 days “at a price irrespective of value” in order to remove these old submarines “before the height of the typhoon season”. The documentation includes a signature “Woodrow Wilson” dated 14 June 1920 agreeing to the Navy proposal. Contracts of sale were drawn up for each of the five vessels and dated 13 July 1920—but no one came forward to bid.
No bids were received within the 30-day period that was hoped to permit the removal of the old craft. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, reported this fact to the Navy Department on 28 July 1920, stating further that they had “no value even as junk”. Accordingly, he proposed that the craft be towed toward Guadaloupe Point and sunk to form part of a breakwater there. The Navy Department’s Solicitor endorsed that proposal on 2 August, recommending approval. The Acting Secretary of the Navy, Gordon Woodbury, signed a letter replying to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, dated 24 Sept. 1920, however, that denied the request to expend the vessels as part of a breakwater. Instead, in this letter the Department designated the five vessels as targets and placed them at the Commander-in-Chief’s disposal for whatever specific use desired.
While
moored in
The Secretary of the Navy’s office issued a letter on 5 January 1920 directing that an inspection in all departments be conducted on the remaining submarines, A-3, A-5, B-1, and B-3, “to determine whether these vessels should be put in condition for efficient operating or whether their condition was such as to make their sale advisable.” The 4th Submarine Division, in its weekly report of operations for the week ending 16 January 1920, reported that the main motors of both A-3 and A-5 were no longer in condition to operate. In response to a Bureau of Engineering request to defer any repair work, OpNav issued an endorsement dated 26 March 1920 to the material bureaus directing that they “expend no funds” on these two vessels.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, sent a message to OpNav on 3 July 1921, recommending that A-3, A-5,
and B-3 be “placed out of commission and dismantled” because the
facilities they occupied were needed to support the new “S” class submarines en
route to the western Pacific. OpNav sent
a message in reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and Commandant, Naval
Station Cavite, on 6 July 1921, directing that A-3, A-5, and B-3
be “hereby detached [from] Submarine Division Four and will be placed out
of commission preparatory to being placed on sale or otherwise disposed
of”. The Navy Department in turn
designated these additional units for target service in a letter to the bureaus
and interested fleet commands dated 14 July 1921. The Bureau of Construction and Repair and the
Bureau of Ordnance each sent a follow up letter on 19 July 1921 to the
Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, directing that all equipment of value be
removed from these three vessels prior to their disposal. They were placed out of commission at 0915
local time on 25 July. The
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, requested permission from OpNav on 5 August
to proceed with stripping the three craft of any useful equipment, a permission
that by this time already was en route in correspondence from the material
bureaus. The Industrial Department, U.S.
Naval Station,
OpNav sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 19 July 1921, asking the status of the five submarines first announced for disposal. The fleet commander sent a message back on the 23rd, confirmed that the vessels were “out of commission with all salvageable material removed.” OpNav asked the Bureau of Ordnance on 30 July 1921 what ammunition was available for the purpose. In this memo, the OpNav staff proposed that “a reasonable allowance of ammunition should be provided for all vessels of the three Destroyer Divisions attached to the Asiatic Fleet, so that different forms of problems and using different methods of fire control could be worked out on that station”. The bureau replied in an endorsement dated 3 August 1921, recommending that the equivalent of one destroyer’s ammunition allowance be allocated for the practice: 40 flat nose projectiles and 360 common rounds. The bureau also recommended that the 40 rounds of flat nosed projectiles be expended against one or more submarines before the expenditure of the common projectiles in order to secure data concerning the functioning of the flat nosed shells.
The so-called “flat nosed” (FN) projectile employed in these tests was a special design adopted in 1917, specifically designed with a flat front end to prevent ricochet and plunge underwater, for use against submerged submarines. FN projectiles also were developed for use in 3-in./23, 3-in./50, 5-in., and 6-in. guns. For the 4-in./50-cal. Gun, FN projectiles had a coefficient of form of 2.40, compared to .67 for the standard long-pointed common projectile. As a result, to fire the FN shell to a range of 4,000 yards, the crew would set the sight bar range (which assumed long-pointed shell) to an index of 7,700 yards. FN shells employed the Mark VII Mod 1 fuze, set in the projectile’s front end, and that had been modeled on the Russian “3 G.T. Exploder” fuze, which was used extensively at this time as a nose-detonating fuze in European artillery.
The Secretary of the Navy sent further instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and other interested activities and offices in a letter dated 11 August 1921. This letter laid out desired details of the target practice and encouraged the Commander-in-Chief to complete the expenditure of the boats prior to the impending arrival at Cavite of Submarine Flotilla Three, which comprised ten new S-class submarines that would need berthing space.
The Navy Department sent a last, late message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, on 12 December 1921 directing that the recently decommissioned B-1 be included in the planned target exercises if they had not already been conducted.
The old submarines’ activity had
fallen to very low levels during 1921 as their service came to an end. B-1, the last vessel decommissioned,
went to sea for the last time on 17 September 1921. The submarine got underway that day at 1048
from its berth at No.3 dock and proceeded into harbor sector 3, diving during
1108 (conning tower under water) to 1121 (deck above water). The exercise complete, B-1 secured to
Dock No.3,
A Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet
letter dated 22 November 1921 direct that B-1 be decommissioned. In accordance with this order, the boat was
placed out of commission at 1400 on 1 Dec. 1921 at No.3 Dock,
Inactive boats “in ordinary” were kept in a state of operational readiness. B-3, for example, was dived regularly into January 1921 despite being “in commission, in ordinary” and lacking any assigned enlisted personnel. The commanding officer and crew of B-1 went aboard the inactive B-3 on each of January 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10, making a practice dive at pierside to ensure material readiness for service. Such testing ended after that time, however, and the ship is believed to have had only one more underway period under own power, that being 24 March 1921. On that day, B-3 was underway on the surface during 0845 through 0930 “for discharging battery”.
Lt. (j.g.) A.E. Bartlett USNRF assumed command of B-3 on 7 June 1921, followed successively by Lieut. R.N. Kennedy USN on 15 Jan. 1921 and Lieut. E.R. Johnson USN on 11 July 1921. A Commandant, 16th Naval District letter of 14 July 1921 directed that the vessel be prepared for decommissioning. “Dismantling” of the vessel began the same day and continued through 25 July when the ship went out of commission. The last entry in the log book, referring to other local activity, was entered at 1318 that day.
Modernization of the Asiatic Fleet Submarine Force. The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, recommended to the Navy Department in a message dated 12 December 1918 that both the destroyer and submarine flotillas of his force be replaced with modern vessels. The message specifically recommended “replacement of submarines A and B class by later and more efficient type. N and O [classes] all available and suitable.” The Navy Department informed the Asiatic Fleet commander by fall 1920 that the fleet’s submarine force was to be modernized. An Op-38 message of 14 October 1920 to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, anticipated that tender Beaver and four (possibly increased to six) submarines would depart the U.S. east coast in early January 1921, possibly further augmented by two additional submarines. Some 26 submarines were designated by OpNav on 18 November 1920 as “fitting out for distant service”. These 26 boats included the S-2 through 4, S-6 through 9, S-14 through 17, and S-30 through 34, as well as R-1 through R-10. OpNav’s submarine force director meanwhile had recommended on 26 July 1920 that, upon completion, 18 new submarines be formed as Flotilla Three comprising Divisions 12 and 18.
OpNav directed on 28 July 1920 that Submarine Flotilla Three—eventually bound for the Asiatic Fleet--would consist of the Submarine Divisions 12 and 18. Division 12 would comprise S-3 through S-9 with Rainbow (AS-7) as tender. Division 18 would comprise S-1, S-2, S-14 through S-17, and S-30 through S-34, with Beaver (AS-5) as tender. The organization was to take effect on 1 August. S-30 through S-34 were detached from Division 18 on 17 Nov. 1920. S-9 was reassigned from Division 12 to Division 18 at that same time.
Flotilla Three passed from the Atlantic
to the Pacific during the winter of 1920-21 via the
Planning the Target Practice. Capt. Willis McDowell, Commander Destroyer
Squadron, Asiatic Fleet, sent a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, on 22 September, laying out a proposal for the nature of the special
gunnery practice against the submarine targets.
Capt. McDowell proposed that the firing take place off Olongapo, “on
account of the distance necessary to tow the targets to get deep water off
Capt. McDowell’s plan called for an initial test on day one where destroyer Talbot would approach a single submarine 10 degrees on the bow, opening fire at a range of 3,000 yards and shooting the forecastle gun for four minutes or until 18 rounds of flat-nosed projectiles were expended. Destroyer Borie would conduct an identical firing next if the submarine was still afloat.
On the second day, Destroyer Division 12 ships would fire at three submarines. The column of ships would start at a point 4,000 yards from the targets. At a distance of 3,500 yards, the column would change course 45 degrees away from the target and the first section of ships would open fire. Each destroyer would shoot at its opposite submarine for three minutes. Subsequently, the second section of destroyers would open fire, concentrating fire in the event that some of the targets already had sunk.
The third test event also was set for day two. In this case, Division 37 destroyers would take position 4,000 yards away from two targets and steam directly at them at 15 knots. Course would be changed 45 degrees at 3,500 yards distance. Fire would be opened at 3,000 yards, the three leading destroyers firing at the lead target with the second section of destroyers firing at the second submarine.
The plan then called for a fourth test, with Division 38 destroyers to fire at two submarines. The destroyers were to take position 4,000 yards from the target and again steam directly at the submarines at a speed of 15 knots. Course would be changed 45 degrees at 3,500 yards distance. Fire would be opened at a range of 3,000 yards, two destroyers firing at the lead submarine and the rear destroyer to fire at the rear submarine. After two minutes, course was to be changed 20 degrees away from the two targets. At the end of three minutes, section one would cease fire and section two open fire. Each destroyer would fire at its own target if still afloat, with fire to be concentrated in the event that only one remained afloat.
The Asiatic Fleet Destroyer Force in
1921. The destroyer force
assigned to conduct the firing against the submarines comprised three divisions
totaling 18 vessels. Division 12,
commanded by Comdr. Fred H. Poteet USN, included Rathburne (DD-113),
division flagship, Commander Poteet commanding the ship (with date of 1 July
1921); Talbot (DD-114), Lt. Comdr. J.C. Van de Carr USN commanding (from
20 June 1921); Waters (DD-115),
Lt. Comdr. E.D. Langworthy USN commanding (from 1 July 1921); Dorsey,
Lt. Comdr. J.C. Jennings USN commanding (from 22 June 1921); Roper
(DD-147), Comdr. M.E. Manley USN commanding (from 23 June 1921); and Zane
(DD-337), Lt. Comdr. L.C. Scheibla USN commanding (from 22 July 1921). These ships arrived in company on the Asiatic
station at
Division 37, commanded by Commander
Charles M. Austin USN, included Chandler (DD-206), Lieut. Comdr. Francis
Cogswell USN commanding (from ); Southard (DD-207), Lt. Comdr. George W. Kenyon USN
commanding (from 15 July 1921); Hovey (DD-208), (Lt. Comdr. Hugh P. Leclair USN
commanding (from 14 July 1920); Long (DD-209), division flagship, Comdr.
C. M. Austin USN commanding (from ); Broome (DD-210), Comdr. C.S.
McWhorter USN commanding (from 18 May 1921); and Alden (DD-211), Comdr.
Eldred B. Armstrong USN commanding (from ).
Hovey and Long arrived on the Asiatic station at
Division 38, commanded by Comdr. Lawrence
P. Treadwell USN, included Smith Thompson (DD-212), Lt. Comdr.
J.H.S. Dessez USN commanding (from 20 Dec. 1919); Barker (DD-213), [Lt.
Comdr. C.C. Windsor USN] commanding (from ); Tracy (DD-214), Comdr. L.P.
Treadwell USN commanding (from 9 March 1920); Borie (DD-215), Lt. Comdr.
E.F. Clement USN commanding (from 24 March 1920); John D. Edwards
(DD-216), Lt. Comdr. Eugene T. Oates USN commanding (from 7 Oct. 1921); and Whipple
(DD-217), commanding (from ). Borie,
John D. Edwards, Smith Thompson, and Tracy
had arrived on the Asiatic station via European waters at
Long and Whipple were absent for the 20 December firing exercise.
Rear Admiral Strauss named Capt. Thomas C. Hart USN on 27 November 1921 the senior member of a board to observe and report upon the firing exercise against the submarine targets. The other members of the board were Capt. Willis McDowell USN, Commander Destroyers Asiatic Fleet, Comdr. Andrew W. Carmichael, Construction Corps USN, and Lieut. Comdr. Herman E. Fischer USN. Capt. Hart and the board observed the operation initially from aboard destroyer Hovey, going aboard in Mariveles harbor at 0600. Disembarking again at Mariveles after the firing by Division 37, Capt. Hart and his party embarked aboard Talbot at 1200.
Conduct of the Gunnery Exercise. Preparations for the forthcoming gunnery practice commenced in earnest on 17 December 1921. The fleet tug Wompatuck’s log book recorded at 1030 local time on that date a Cavite Navy yard tug, not identified, placed the A-3, A-5, A-6, and A-8 (sic) alongside to Wompatuck’s port side while anchored in Canacao Bay. Wompatuck, under the command of Lieut. (j.g.) James W. Coghlin USNRF commanding (who relieved Lieut. Claude L. Brown USNRF on 11 July 1921), got underway at 0545 the following morning, bound for Mariveles Bay at the south end of the Bataan Peninsula. Arriving at 1145, the tug awaited the arrival of Asiatic Fleet destroyers that begin to arrive at 1315. Zane and Roper entered harbor at that time and proceeded to moor near Wompatuck. The tug placed A-5 and A-6 alongside Zane at 1355, followed at 1430 with similar placement of A-3 and A-8 alongside Roper.
This account of activity taken from Wompatuck’s log book unfortunately is in error in identifying a submarine as “A-8” because the highest numbered boat was A-7. A process of elimination in reviewing other tug data entries indicates that the vessel identified here as A-8 actually was A-2.
Division 12 Operations, 20 December. USS Talbot. Destroyer Talbot was by far the most
active of the 16 destroyers participating in the gunnery exercise on 20
December. Talbot got underway at
0600 on 20 December to commence the initial phase of the exercise on the firing
range to the west of
Talbot returned to
Subsequent analysis by Capt. Hart’s board recorded that Talbot fired 18 flat-nosed projectiles with a “Russian quick-acting fuze” (i.e., the Mark VII Mod 1) that exploded on impact with the water or with the target hull, “in each case giving a low-order explosion. On two hits a large bright flash was observed when the projectile burst upon first impact with the steel hull, showing that the greater part of the explosive effect was expended outside the hull on the firing side. On this firing it is believed that three good hits, with three other possible ones, were made on the submarine before she sank. The submarine remained afloat for about four minutes after the first hit, the total time of firing for the 18 shots being 5 minutes and 22 seconds, and then sank, stern down”. Not surprisingly, the fleet board considered the fuze action on these projectiles to be too quick.
None of the records located
identified the specific submarine employed in the first test. Review of numerous reports and logs suggest
that this first unit to be expended was A-5. A-5 was one of four vessels (A-2,
A-3, A-5, and A-6) that were towed by Wompatuck
from
Capt. Hart, the senior member of the board overseeing the practice, and the other board members came aboard Talbot at 1200 to observe the next phase of operations. Talbot got underway at 1215, and worked up to 20 knots speed. Talbot thus was present as Division 37 ships opened fire at 1415, continuing to shoot until 1429. At that time Talbot stood over toward the damaged submarine A-6, heaving to at 1440. Talbot fired common projectiles at a range of 600 yards, with the second shot hitting the craft right at the waterline. A-6 sank four minutes latter, nose down.
Talbot then stood away and prepared to observe firing by Division 38. Talbot’s log recorded Division 38 opening fire at 1545 and ceasing fire at 1550. Talbot prepared to open fire at 1610, actually commencing fire at 1624 and ceasing fire at 1626. This last firing was made against B-1, which remained afloat despite Division 38’s efforts, and Talbot also failed the sink the vessel.
The day’s operations complete, Talbot
stood into
Division 12—General Operations. The five remaining units of Division 12 conducted their practice at about 1110, firing in two groups. Section one, firing first, comprised Zane, Rathburne, and Dorsey. Section two comprised Roper, Talbot, and Waters. The practice was completed quickly. Three submarines were cut adrift in the open sea. The first section of destroyers hit both the second and third submarines with the third salvo, and both units sank in about two minutes, stern down. The first section’s fourth salvo hit the first submarine but the vessel did not sink.
The remaining submarine received a direct hit from Talbot’s last shot and sank, nose down, one minute later.
During this practice, which was conducted entirely with common projectiles, one projectile burst in the air and two others ricocheted without bursting. The division expended the entire ammunition allowance earmarked for the practice.
The specific submarines expended in
the firing by Division 12 are not identified anywhere in reports and logs that
have been consulted. By a process of
elimination, it appears that the three submarines in question were A-4, A-7,
and B-2. Capt. Hart’s report
explicitly associates Division 37’s later firing with both A-3 and A-6,
and thus it seems likely that the three vessels remaining from the four
delivered by Wompatuck on 18 December were the vessels attacked by
Division 37 at about 1330. Assuming the
two “B” boats were held for last, this leaves the three A-4, A-7,
and B-2 as noted for the 1110 firing event. Tug Wompatuck towed these latter three
vessels from
In fairness, however, it needs to be recorded that Roper’s log states that Division 12 fired at A-3 and “A-8” (A-2) at 1111, which would indeed imply a reversal of the two sets of target boats for the 1110 and the 1330 firings. Talbot’s log refers to firing at “B-6” (presumably a corruption of A-6) at 1440 (follow-on to the 1330 event) while Tracy’s log refers to firing at A-4 and A-6 (which are unlikely to ever have been together, based on tug movements) at 1530!
USS Zane. Zane’s log book reports that the destroyer went alongside fleet tug Wompatuck at Mariveles at 1350 on 19 December and took submarines A-5 and A-6 alongside. The destroyer then got underway with the submarines in tow, anchoring at 1400. The subs are noted as still being alongside as of 0400 but subsequent events are unclear. Tug Wompatuck is reported to have gotten underway with one submarine at 0630, and apparently this was one of the vessels moored with Zane. (As noted above in connection with Talbot, the sub removed at 0630 might have been A-5, potentially the unit that was sunk at about 0747.) Zane in turn got underway at 0959, apparently without any submarine in tow for no such note is made, and proceeded to the exercise area.
Zane commenced firing at
1111 and ceased firing at 1115. The ship
returned to
USS Rathburne. Rathburne, Division 12 flagship, got underway at 0955 on 20 December and proceeded with other division units toward the exercise area. Rathburne went to General Quarters for drill at 1005, securing at 1011. At 1100 GQ was set again and the ship commenced the run in toward the submarine targets at 1106. Rathburne opened fire at 1112, ceasing fire at 1115. The destroyers returned to Mariveles harbor, with Rathburne anchoring at 1137.
The ship’s commanding officer later reported the ship’s successful performance: “Fire control and shooting were excellent. The first ranging shot from one gun was 100 yards over; the sight-bar range was immediately lowered 100 yards and salvo fire was opened; the first salvo straddled the ex-submarine and continued to do so until the ex-submarine sank in about 50 seconds”.
Rathburne’s log recorded
that Division 37 got underway from Mariveles harbor at 1200 to participate in
the gunnery exercise. The log further
noted that tug
Rathburne’s log recorded that Division 38 got underway from Mariveles harbor at 1240 to participate in the gunnery exercise.
Rathburne got underway at 1559 as
Division 12, less Dorsey and Talbot, departed Mariveles. Proceeding back to
USS Dorsey. Dorsey got underway at 0953 on 20
December and stood out with Division 12.
The ship set General Quarters at 1103 and commenced firing at 1112. Dorsey ceased fire at 1114 and
recorded that the target was sunk. The
ship anchored at 1135 in Mariveles harbor, remaining there until 1605 when the
ship departed for
Lt. C. Campbell, chief observer, reported that “The Twelfth Division, the Dorsey third ship in column, steamed directly toward the submarine on a westerly course, speed 15 knots. When the range was estimated as 3,500 yards, course was changed 90 degrees to the right to north. It was the intention to open fire with the first section, each vessel at its opposite submarine, when the range was 3,000 yards. The left-hand submarine, which was the Dorsey’s target was considerably closer than the other two, the range-finder reading, which was probably inaccurate, being 1,700 yards when fire was opened. The sight-bar ranges varied from 1,600 yards to 2,000 yards. The Dorsey opened fire at 1112:15, one hundred twentieth meridian east time, sight-bar range 2,000 yards, the submarine bearing 268 (relative), with a one-gun salvo. Nine salvos were fired. Salvos 1 and 4 were of one gun, 3, 7, and 9 were of three guns, and 2, 5, 6, and 8 were of three guns each. Possible hits were made on the third and fifth salvo. At least one and possibly two direct hits were made on eighth salvo, the smoke from the explosion of the shells being plainly visible. This was one minute and 30 seconds after the first shot. The submarine sank stern first at 1114:20, one minute and 58 seconds after the first shot was fired. The sight-bar range for the eighth salvo was 1,800 yards. The patterns were small, possibly about 100 yards”.
Fleet tug
USS Roper. Roper got underway at 0955, forming up in company with the other units of Division 12. Roper went to general quarters at 1105 and the division commenced firing at 1111 at A-3 and “A-8”. The first section ceased fire at 1113. Together with the other units of the Division’s second section, Roper commenced firing with the port side battery at 1115.
Roper was the lead ship of the second section. The ships in the section fired in sequence, spaced by 10 seconds, to allow time to spot individual splashes. Roper’s first salvo consisted of two shots, one each from Nos.2 and 4 guns. According to Lt. Comdr. W.H. Porter, chief observer for this event, “the shot from No.4 was wild and a spot of up 200 yards was applied. The next salvo from No.1 and 2 guns were well placed and appeared to hit the center submarine. From then on until the submarine finally sank at 1118, the pointing and firing was excellent and control good”.
Roper secured from general
Quarters at 1120, having fired 14 rounds.
Roper stood into Mariveles harbor at 1120 and tied up at dock at
1136. Roper got underway at 1540
and proceeded out of
USS Waters. Waters got underway at 0959 on 20 December and joined the Division 12 column as the rear ship, immediately behind Talbot, the vessels steaming in line ahead at 300 yard intervals. The first section of Division 12 arrived on the exercise range at 1112 and fired at the three submarine targets present. Fire ceased at 1119 with the three craft sunk. Division 12 turned at 1120 to return to Mariveles harbor, Waters anchoring at 1135.
The ship’s gunnery officer reported later that “it was the intention of the chief fire control officer to use director fire, but due to not having sufficient roll it was necessary to shift to pointer fire just before opening fire. The sight setting errors on No.1 gun are believed to be due to this, also to the wind interference and the firing of the other ships of the division, which is believed is responsible in a large degree to the other errors in sight setting”.
Waters’ log book recorded
that the new submarine S-15 stood into Mariveles harbor at 1225, but the
boats of Flotilla Three played no part in the demise of their predecessor
undersea boats of the Asiatic Fleet.
Division 12 got underway at 1539, proceeding back to
Division 37 Operations. Division 37, comprising five participating vessels, also fired at three submarine targets. In this case, Capt. Hart’s report on the event identifies two of these three vessels, A-3 and A-6. Review of tug movements with the submarines strongly suggests that A-2 would have been the third unit of this set. A-2 and A-3 both were transferred from tug Wompatuck to destroyer Roper for safety pending transfer to the firing range, while one of the pair (A-5 and A-6) delivered by Wompatuck to Zane at the same time was removed early on the 20th, potentially for the 0733 firing by Talbot.
USS Chandler.
General Quarters was set aboard
USS Southard. Southard, a unit of Division 37, was
anchored in
Southard arrived on the
gunnery range at 1330 and the division commenced firing one minute later.
Southard’s log recorded that
Division 37 stood in at 1420 towards anchorage and hove to at 1500. The division then got underway at 1515 for
USS Hovey. Hovey was anchored in Mariveles harbor on the morning of 20 December. At 0600 Capt. Hart, Comdr. Carmichael, and Lt. Comdr. H.E. Fisher came aboard to observe the practice. Hovey got underway at 0630, twenty minutes behind Talbot, and arrived on the range at 0710. Hovey commenced fire at 0732, recording that the submarine target sank at 0736. Setting standard speed at 15 knots, Hovey proceeded back to Mariveles harbor.
Hovey’s log recorded the
sighting of Division 12 and tuges with submarine targets departing harbor at
0936. An observer party from
Capt. Hart’s board provided a thorough description of the damage incurred by Hovey’s target, A-3, because the vessel remained afloat for about 12 minutes, permitting observers to view the damage at some length. The report reads as follows:
“(a) Two clean holes on side of strength hull nearest firing ship and two holes on opposite side, one of about 1 and a half feet in diameter and the other 8 inches in diameter and of jagged outline. The plating in both cases projected outward, showing that the two shells had exploded within the strength hull.
(b) One clean hole through both sides of forward superstructure plating, showing that the projectile did not burst in this case before passing through.
© Several small holes in after superstructure, possibly caused by fragments from bursts of short shots. The strength hull may possibly have received some damage.”
Hovey then proceeded to
Mariveles until 1524, when course was set for
USS Broome. Broome was anchored in Mariveles harbor early on the morning of 20 December. The ship sent a party of observers to Talbot at 0545. The ship’s log noted the busy comings and goings of Division 12 that morning as Division 37 waited their turn. The ship’s umpire party returned aboard from Talbot at 1145. At 1148, however, a similar party from Rathburne came aboard Broome to observe the forthcoming operations.
Broome got underway at 1200 and joined column with other Division 37 units, Broome being the second ship in the column. Broome commenced fire at 1334 at the three target craft, ceasing fire at 1348. Broome and Alden opened fire at a range of 3,000 yards. Broome fired twenty rounds in three-gun salvos and had “four direct hits observed in target, which sank shortly after [the] end of [the] run”.
Broome stood into Mariveles
harbor at 1450 and the visiting observer party departed at 1515. The ship got underway at 1528 and made for
the firing range. Arriving at 1600, the
ship lay to until 1718, when Comdr. A.W. Carmichael, Construction Corps USN,
came aboard from Talbot en route to Olongapo. Broome proceeded north toward
Olongapo, passing
Division 38 Operations. USS Smith Thompson. Smith Thompson got underway at 1435 on 20 December to participate in the experimental practice against submarine targets. The ship joined the Division 38 column at 1450, proceeding in order Tracy (guide), Borie, John D. Edwards, Barker, and Smith Thompson. Smith Thompson’s log reported that the formation went to full speed at 1537 but returned at 1541 to standard speed (15 knots). The ship commenced fire with Guns Nos.1, 2, and 4 at 1602, the division in column firing against two submarine targets. One submarine was reported to sink at 1603. Smith Thompson ceased fire at 1605, having expended 20 rounds, using SPD 1527 issue powder.
The firing complete, Smith Thompson
went ahead at 1608, setting standard speed at 1701 but heaving to at 1730 to
transfer observers to Talbot.
Disembarking the observing party at 1740, Smith Thompson
went to full speed at 1755 before returning to standard speed, which was noted
by 1840. Smith Thompson
entered
USS Tracy.