The only published information on the disposition of the A and B Classes was that they were ‘sunk as targets’ in the early 1920s. A question was posed in Warship International the quarterly publication of the International Naval Research Organization (INRO). The question asked for information as to what ships sank the boats, where there were sunk and when. The location information was important because if the boat hulls could be located and raised, they would be the oldest of the early commissioned submarines that remained. Mr. Christopher Wright provided the following answer. We are indebted to him for his thoroughness and ability to locate the information given below.
The answer:
The need
for submarines to provide for local harbor defense at “
The
Secretary of the Navy’s office referred the General Board recommendation to the
Bureau of Construction and Repair on 1 July for consideration of the practical
issues involved in sending these small craft out to East Asian waters. The bureau reported back on 10 August,
allowing that torpedo boats could be sent out once they were put in a
“thoroughly efficient condition as to both hull and machinery.” The bureau considered, however, that it was
“impracticable” to transport or tow submarines “for so great an over-sea
journey as that involved in taking them to the
In the meantime, the Secretary of the Navy asked the Board of Inspection and Survey on 30 June to determine which five boats on the Atlantic coast might be in adequate condition to be sent to the Asiatic station. After clarifying its understanding of the task on 7 July, the survey board reported back to the Navy Department on 1 August. The Board’s findings were discouraging, for it considered that none of the five boats in question “can be properly considered suitable”. The five “most suitable” were the Porter, DuPont, Barney, Bagley, and Biddle. The board further recommended that the Navy Yards carefully examine the condition of the hulls and machinery of these vessels, and that they be evaluated locally over two months’ time prior to deployment.
After
considering the Bureau of Construction and Repair’s views, acting Secretary of
the Navy Charles Darling directed on 18 August that six DuPont class
torpedo boats be sent to the
The
Secretary of the Navy then directed the Commandant, Norfolk Navy Yard, on 19
September 1904, to overhaul the five previously named vessels and prepare them
for deployment with provisions for towing under open ocean conditions. Inspections of the craft showed that they
were not well suited for the planned deployment, however. Naval Constructor Robert Stocker at
Submarines for the Asiatic Fleet. Instead, some nine submarines, all but one of
the first two series production classes in the fleet, were transported out to
the Philippines as deck cargo in four separate lifts during 1908-1915. The submarines were based at Cavite Navy
Yard, a small facility inside
The submarines spent virtually all
their time in the
During the World War I years, the
submarines based at
Retirement and Disposal of the Submarines. A-4 was the first submarine to be inactivated, being placed in commission in ordinary (a form of reduced commission, with a greatly reduced personnel strength assigned) by the beginning of 1918.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, ordered on 28 December 1917 that A-3 be placed in commission in ordinary. A-3 was placed in commission in ordinary on 16 February 1918. As of this date, the machinery plant still was in good condition, and the storage batteries entirely removed, cleaned, and prepared for restoration to service. All tanks were emptied except the main ballast and after main ballast tanks, which were filled with water. A-3 conducted some local operations during fall 1918, possibly placed in operational service temporarily with personnel from other submarines. The vessel apparently was returned to full commission by early 1919.
A-6 subsequently was placed in commission in ordinary on 30 November 1918. Unlike A-3, however, A-6 was not ready for early reactivation. The vessel’s report of inactivation, dated 30 November 1918, reported that the storage batteries were in poor condition: “The batteries of this vessel have seen more than four years of constant service and are worn out. It was due to the condition of the batteries that this vessel was placed in commission in ordinary.” A-7 also was placed in commission in ordinary by October 1918, apparently in view of engineering problems.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directed early in 1919 that all remaining active submarines except B-1 be placed in commission in ordinary immediately. B-1 was to continue in full commission. The Commandant, Naval Stations Cavite and Olongapo, passed this instruction on 5 March 1919 to the submarine division commander.
A-2 accordingly was placed in commission in ordinary on 6 March 1919. The commanding officer’s final report upon inactivation noted that the storage batteries were in bad condition and was “as a whole…entirely worn out”. Some of the battery plates had been in use for nine years. The main engines were considered to be in only fair condition, with pistons and rings in need of overhaul. The hull, on the other hand, was evaluated as being in “excellent condition and shows but little deterioration due to the age of this vessel.” The vessel’s assigned crew while in ordinary comprised one gunner’s mate, one machinst’s mate, and one electrician. Similar letter reports of the inactivation at this time of the other vessels—A-3, A-5, B-2, and B-3—have not been researched but the flotilla’s weekly report of operations dated 7 March 1919 records that these four other vessels also were placed in commission in ordinary on 6 March 1919.
The Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter on 11 November 1919 to the Chief, Bureau of Navigation, directing that the bureau issue the necessary instructions to place A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-3 out of commission. OpNav followed up with a letter dated 12 November 1919 to the three material bureaus (C&R, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance) reporting that submarines A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-2 “have been ordered placed out of commission”. The same letter noted that submarines A-3, A-5, and B-3 were in commission in ordinary and that G-1 [B-1 was meant] was in full commission. The letter stated that “it is intended to continue these four vessels in service until other submarines arrive on that station.” Naval Station Cavite duly reported to the Navy Department by message dated 12 December 1919 that A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-2 had been placed out of commission that day.
The Commandant, Cavite Navy Yard, formed a special board to inspect the five submarines placed out of commission. The board submitted a report dated 11 December 1919. The vessels all were laid up with “all special precautions for the safety, care, and preservation of the hull, engines, and auxiliaries…taken.” The board found that the vessels’ engines were in “fair condition, though in need of overhaul and adjustment”, with the exception of A-7. The report stated that “the cylinders on the A-7 are slightly scored, piston rings are badly worn, and bearings are in need of adjustment. The shaft is out of alignment and clutch is in need of repairs and general overhaul of engine is necessary.”
The Navy Department directed on 26 December 1919 that the five submarines slated for inactivation—A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, and B-3—be offered for sale “as the cost of repairs and upkeep is disproportionate to their value to the Navy”. The Bureau of Navigation was directed to prepare orders to strike these vessels from the Navy Register “upon receipt of the notice of their sale”. Accordingly, they were placed on sale as they lay at Cavite Navy Yard. The Board of Inspection and Survey provided the Secretary of the Navy with a memorandum dated 18 August 1919, identifying the assessed sale value of the craft as scrap. The “A” class boats each were assessed as being worth $1000; the somewhat larger B-3 was appraised at $1200. The Bureau of Navigation sent a memorandum on 26 May 1920 to the Solicitor, reporting that “this date issued the necessary orders striking the above named submarines from the Navy Register”. (If consistent with the Department’s 26 December guidance, however, these “necessary orders” remained in abeyance until authoritative evidence of successful sale was in hand.)
Acting Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt sent a message on 1 June 1920 to the Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, directing that the five submarines be advertised and sold. The Navy Department in turn requested on 11 June 1920 that the President approve the sale of the vessels within 30 days “at a price irrespective of value” in order to remove these old submarines “before the height of the typhoon season”. The documentation includes a signature “Woodrow Wilson” dated 14 June 1920 agreeing to the Navy proposal. Contracts of sale were drawn up for each of the five vessels and dated 13 July 1920—but no one came forward to bid.
No bids were received within the 30-day period that was hoped to permit the removal of the old craft. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, reported this fact to the Navy Department on 28 July 1920, stating further that they had “no value even as junk”. Accordingly, he proposed that the craft be towed toward Guadaloupe Point and sunk to form part of a breakwater there. The Navy Department’s Solicitor endorsed that proposal on 2 August, recommending approval. The Acting Secretary of the Navy, Gordon Woodbury, signed a letter replying to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, dated 24 Sept. 1920, however, that denied the request to expend the vessels as part of a breakwater. Instead, in this letter the Department designated the five vessels as targets and placed them at the Commander-in-Chief’s disposal for whatever specific use desired.
While
moored in
The Secretary of the Navy’s office issued a letter on 5 January 1920 directing that an inspection in all departments be conducted on the remaining submarines, A-3, A-5, B-1, and B-3, “to determine whether these vessels should be put in condition for efficient operating or whether their condition was such as to make their sale advisable.” The 4th Submarine Division, in its weekly report of operations for the week ending 16 January 1920, reported that the main motors of both A-3 and A-5 were no longer in condition to operate. In response to a Bureau of Engineering request to defer any repair work, OpNav issued an endorsement dated 26 March 1920 to the material bureaus directing that they “expend no funds” on these two vessels.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, sent a message to OpNav on 3 July 1921, recommending that A-3, A-5,
and B-3 be “placed out of commission and dismantled” because the
facilities they occupied were needed to support the new “S” class submarines en
route to the western Pacific. OpNav sent
a message in reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and Commandant, Naval
Station Cavite, on 6 July 1921, directing that A-3, A-5, and B-3
be “hereby detached [from] Submarine Division Four and will be placed out
of commission preparatory to being placed on sale or otherwise disposed
of”. The Navy Department in turn
designated these additional units for target service in a letter to the bureaus
and interested fleet commands dated 14 July 1921. The Bureau of Construction and Repair and the
Bureau of Ordnance each sent a follow up letter on 19 July 1921 to the
Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, directing that all equipment of value be
removed from these three vessels prior to their disposal. They were placed out of commission at 0915
local time on 25 July. The
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, requested permission from OpNav on 5 August
to proceed with stripping the three craft of any useful equipment, a permission
that by this time already was en route in correspondence from the material
bureaus. The Industrial Department, U.S.
Naval Station,
OpNav sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 19 July 1921, asking the status of the five submarines first announced for disposal. The fleet commander sent a message back on the 23rd, confirmed that the vessels were “out of commission with all salvageable material removed.” OpNav asked the Bureau of Ordnance on 30 July 1921 what ammunition was available for the purpose. In this memo, the OpNav staff proposed that “a reasonable allowance of ammunition should be provided for all vessels of the three Destroyer Divisions attached to the Asiatic Fleet, so that different forms of problems and using different methods of fire control could be worked out on that station”. The bureau replied in an endorsement dated 3 August 1921, recommending that the equivalent of one destroyer’s ammunition allowance be allocated for the practice: 40 flat nose projectiles and 360 common rounds. The bureau also recommended that the 40 rounds of flat nosed projectiles be expended against one or more submarines before the expenditure of the common projectiles in order to secure data concerning the functioning of the flat nosed shells.
The so-called “flat nosed” (FN) projectile employed in these tests was a special design adopted in 1917, specifically designed with a flat front end to prevent ricochet and plunge underwater, for use against submerged submarines. FN projectiles also were developed for use in 3-in./23, 3-in./50, 5-in., and 6-in. guns. For the 4-in./50-cal. Gun, FN projectiles had a coefficient of form of 2.40, compared to .67 for the standard long-pointed common projectile. As a result, to fire the FN shell to a range of 4,000 yards, the crew would set the sight bar range (which assumed long-pointed shell) to an index of 7,700 yards. FN shells employed the Mark VII Mod 1 fuze, set in the projectile’s front end, and that had been modeled on the Russian “3 G.T. Exploder” fuze, which was used extensively at this time as a nose-detonating fuze in European artillery.
The Secretary of the Navy sent further instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and other interested activities and offices in a letter dated 11 August 1921. This letter laid out desired details of the target practice and encouraged the Commander-in-Chief to complete the expenditure of the boats prior to the impending arrival at Cavite of Submarine Flotilla Three, which comprised ten new S-class submarines that would need berthing space.
The Navy Department sent a last, late message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commandant, Naval Station Cavite, on 12 December 1921 directing that the recently decommissioned B-1 be included in the planned target exercises if they had not already been conducted.
The old submarines’ activity had
fallen to very low levels during 1921 as their service came to an end. B-1, the last vessel decommissioned,
went to sea for the last time on 17 September 1921. The submarine got underway that day at 1048
from its berth at No.3 dock and proceeded into harbor sector 3, diving during
1108 (conning tower under water) to 1121 (deck above water). The exercise complete, B-1 secured to
Dock No.3,
A Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet
letter dated 22 November 1921 direct that B-1 be decommissioned. In accordance with this order, the boat was
placed out of commission at 1400 on 1 Dec. 1921 at No.3 Dock,
Inactive boats “in ordinary” were kept in a state of operational readiness. B-3, for example, was dived regularly into January 1921 despite being “in commission, in ordinary” and lacking any assigned enlisted personnel. The commanding officer and crew of B-1 went aboard the inactive B-3 on each of January 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10, making a practice dive at pierside to ensure material readiness for service. Such testing ended after that time, however, and the ship is believed to have had only one more underway period under own power, that being 24 March 1921. On that day, B-3 was underway on the surface during 0845 through 0930 “for discharging battery”.
Lt. (j.g.) A.E. Bartlett USNRF assumed command of B-3 on 7 June 1921, followed successively by Lieut. R.N. Kennedy USN on 15 Jan. 1921 and Lieut. E.R. Johnson USN on 11 July 1921. A Commandant, 16th Naval District letter of 14 July 1921 directed that the vessel be prepared for decommissioning. “Dismantling” of the vessel began the same day and continued through 25 July when the ship went out of commission. The last entry in the log book, referring to other local activity, was entered at 1318 that day.
Modernization of the Asiatic Fleet Submarine Force. The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, recommended to the Navy Department in a message dated 12 December 1918 that both the destroyer and submarine flotillas of his force be replaced with modern vessels. The message specifically recommended “replacement of submarines A and B class by later and more efficient type. N and O [classes] all available and suitable.” The Navy Department informed the Asiatic Fleet commander by fall 1920 that the fleet’s submarine force was to be modernized. An Op-38 message of 14 October 1920 to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, anticipated that tender Beaver and four (possibly increased to six) submarines would depart the U.S. east coast in early January 1921, possibly further augmented by two additional submarines. Some 26 submarines were designated by OpNav on 18 November 1920 as “fitting out for distant service”. These 26 boats included the S-2 through 4, S-6 through 9, S-14 through 17, and S-30 through 34, as well as R-1 through R-10. OpNav’s submarine force director meanwhile had recommended on 26 July 1920 that, upon completion, 18 new submarines be formed as Flotilla Three comprising Divisions 12 and 18.
OpNav directed on 28 July 1920 that Submarine Flotilla Three—eventually bound for the Asiatic Fleet--would consist of the Submarine Divisions 12 and 18. Division 12 would comprise S-3 through S-9 with Rainbow (AS-7) as tender. Division 18 would comprise S-1, S-2, S-14 through S-17, and S-30 through S-34, with Beaver (AS-5) as tender. The organization was to take effect on 1 August. S-30 through S-34 were detached from Division 18 on 17 Nov. 1920. S-9 was reassigned from Division 12 to Division 18 at that same time.
Flotilla Three passed from the
Atlantic to the Pacific during the winter of 1920-21 via the
Planning the Target Practice. Capt. Willis McDowell, Commander Destroyer
Squadron, Asiatic Fleet, sent a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, on 22 September, laying out a proposal for the nature of the special
gunnery practice against the submarine targets.
Capt. McDowell proposed that the firing take place off Olongapo, “on
account of the distance necessary to tow the targets to get deep water off
Capt. McDowell’s plan called for an initial test on day one where destroyer Talbot would approach a single submarine 10 degrees on the bow, opening fire at a range of 3,000 yards and shooting the forecastle gun for four minutes or until 18 rounds of flat-nosed projectiles were expended. Destroyer Borie would conduct an identical firing next if the submarine was still afloat.
On the second day, Destroyer Division 12 ships would fire at three submarines. The column of ships would start at a point 4,000 yards from the targets. At a distance of 3,500 yards, the column would change course 45 degrees away from the target and the first section of ships would open fire. Each destroyer would shoot at its opposite submarine for three minutes. Subsequently, the second section of destroyers would open fire, concentrating fire in the event that some of the targets already had sunk.
The third test event also was set for day two. In this case, Division 37 destroyers would take position 4,000 yards away from two targets and steam directly at them at 15 knots. Course would be changed 45 degrees at 3,500 yards distance. Fire would be opened at 3,000 yards, the three leading destroyers firing at the lead target with the second section of destroyers firing at the second submarine.
The plan then called for a fourth test, with Division 38 destroyers to fire at two submarines. The destroyers were to take position 4,000 yards from the target and again steam directly at the submarines at a speed of 15 knots. Course would be changed 45 degrees at 3,500 yards distance. Fire would be opened at a range of 3,000 yards, two destroyers firing at the lead submarine and the rear destroyer to fire at the rear submarine. After two minutes, course was to be changed 20 degrees away from the two targets. At the end of three minutes, section one would cease fire and section two open fire. Each destroyer would fire at its own target if still afloat, with fire to be concentrated in the event that only one remained afloat.
The Asiatic Fleet Destroyer Force in 1921. The destroyer force assigned to conduct the
firing against the submarines comprised three divisions totaling 18
vessels. Division 12, commanded by
Comdr. Fred H. Poteet USN, included Rathburne (DD-113), division
flagship, Commander Poteet commanding the ship (with date of 1 July 1921); Talbot
(DD-114), Lt. Comdr. J.C. Van de Carr USN commanding (from 20 June 1921); Waters
(DD-115), Lt. Comdr. E.D. Langworthy
USN commanding (from 1 July 1921); Dorsey, Lt. Comdr. J.C. Jennings USN
commanding (from 22 June 1921); Roper (DD-147), Comdr. M.E. Manley USN
commanding (from 23 June 1921); and Zane (DD-337), Lt. Comdr. L.C.
Scheibla USN commanding (from 22 July
1921). These ships arrived in company on
the Asiatic station at
Division 37, commanded by Commander
Charles M. Austin USN, included Chandler (DD-206), Lieut. Comdr. Francis
Cogswell USN commanding (from ); Southard (DD-207), Lt. Comdr. George W. Kenyon USN
commanding (from 15 July 1921); Hovey (DD-208), (Lt. Comdr. Hugh P. Leclair USN
commanding (from 14 July 1920); Long (DD-209), division flagship, Comdr.
C. M. Austin USN commanding (from ); Broome (DD-210), Comdr. C.S.
McWhorter USN commanding (from 18 May 1921); and Alden (DD-211), Comdr.
Eldred B. Armstrong USN commanding (from ).
Hovey and Long arrived on the Asiatic station at
Division 38, commanded by Comdr. Lawrence
P. Treadwell USN, included Smith Thompson (DD-212), Lt. Comdr.
J.H.S. Dessez USN commanding (from 20 Dec. 1919); Barker (DD-213), [Lt.
Comdr. C.C. Windsor USN] commanding (from ); Tracy (DD-214), Comdr. L.P.
Treadwell USN commanding (from 9 March 1920); Borie (DD-215), Lt. Comdr.
E.F. Clement USN commanding (from 24 March 1920); John D. Edwards
(DD-216), Lt. Comdr. Eugene T. Oates USN commanding (from 7 Oct. 1921); and Whipple
(DD-217), commanding (from ). Borie,
John D. Edwards, Smith Thompson, and Tracy
had arrived on the Asiatic station via European waters at
Long and Whipple were absent for the 20 December firing exercise.
Rear Admiral Strauss named Capt. Thomas C. Hart USN on 27 November 1921 the senior member of a board to observe and report upon the firing exercise against the submarine targets. The other members of the board were Capt. Willis McDowell USN, Commander Destroyers Asiatic Fleet, Comdr. Andrew W. Carmichael, Construction Corps USN, and Lieut. Comdr. Herman E. Fischer USN. Capt. Hart and the board observed the operation initially from aboard destroyer Hovey, going aboard in Mariveles harbor at 0600. Disembarking again at Mariveles after the firing by Division 37, Capt. Hart and his party embarked aboard Talbot at 1200.
Conduct of the Gunnery Exercise. Preparations for the forthcoming gunnery practice commenced in earnest on 17 December 1921. The fleet tug Wompatuck’s log book recorded at 1030 local time on that date a Cavite Navy yard tug, not identified, placed the A-3, A-5, A-6, and A-8 (sic) alongside to Wompatuck’s port side while anchored in Canacao Bay. Wompatuck, under the command of Lieut. (j.g.) James W. Coghlin USNRF commanding (who relieved Lieut. Claude L. Brown USNRF on 11 July 1921), got underway at 0545 the following morning, bound for Mariveles Bay at the south end of the Bataan Peninsula. Arriving at 1145, the tug awaited the arrival of Asiatic Fleet destroyers that begin to arrive at 1315. Zane and Roper entered harbor at that time and proceeded to moor near Wompatuck. The tug placed A-5 and A-6 alongside Zane at 1355, followed at 1430 with similar placement of A-3 and A-8 alongside Roper.
This account of activity taken from Wompatuck’s log book unfortunately is in error in identifying a submarine as “A-8” because the highest numbered boat was A-7. A process of elimination in reviewing other tug data entries indicates that the vessel identified here as A-8 actually was A-2.
Division 12 Operations, 20 December. USS Talbot. Destroyer Talbot was by far the most
active of the 16 destroyers participating in the gunnery exercise on 20
December. Talbot got underway at
0600 on 20 December to commence the initial phase of the exercise on the firing
range to the west of
Talbot returned to
Subsequent analysis by Capt. Hart’s board recorded that Talbot fired 18 flat-nosed projectiles with a “Russian quick-acting fuze” (i.e., the Mark VII Mod 1) that exploded on impact with the water or with the target hull, “in each case giving a low-order explosion. On two hits a large bright flash was observed when the projectile burst upon first impact with the steel hull, showing that the greater part of the explosive effect was expended outside the hull on the firing side. On this firing it is believed that three good hits, with three other possible ones, were made on the submarine before she sank. The submarine remained afloat for about four minutes after the first hit, the total time of firing for the 18 shots being 5 minutes and 22 seconds, and then sank, stern down”. Not surprisingly, the fleet board considered the fuze action on these projectiles to be too quick.
None of the records located
identified the specific submarine employed in the first test. Review of numerous reports and logs suggest
that this first unit to be expended was A-5. A-5 was one of four vessels (A-2,
A-3, A-5, and A-6) that were towed by Wompatuck
from
Capt. Hart, the senior member of the board overseeing the practice, and the other board members came aboard Talbot at 1200 to observe the next phase of operations. Talbot got underway at 1215, and worked up to 20 knots speed. Talbot thus was present as Division 37 ships opened fire at 1415, continuing to shoot until 1429. At that time Talbot stood over toward the damaged submarine A-6, heaving to at 1440. Talbot fired common projectiles at a range of 600 yards, with the second shot hitting the craft right at the waterline. A-6 sank four minutes latter, nose down.
Talbot then stood away and prepared to observe firing by Division 38. Talbot’s log recorded Division 38 opening fire at 1545 and ceasing fire at 1550. Talbot prepared to open fire at 1610, actually commencing fire at 1624 and ceasing fire at 1626. This last firing was made against B-1, which remained afloat despite Division 38’s efforts, and Talbot also failed the sink the vessel.
The day’s operations complete, Talbot
stood into
Division 12—General Operations. The five remaining units of Division 12 conducted their practice at about 1110, firing in two groups. Section one, firing first, comprised Zane, Rathburne, and Dorsey. Section two comprised Roper, Talbot, and Waters. The practice was completed quickly. Three submarines were cut adrift in the open sea. The first section of destroyers hit both the second and third submarines with the third salvo, and both units sank in about two minutes, stern down. The first section’s fourth salvo hit the first submarine but the vessel did not sink.
The remaining submarine received a direct hit from Talbot’s last shot and sank, nose down, one minute later.
During this practice, which was conducted entirely with common projectiles, one projectile burst in the air and two others ricocheted without bursting. The division expended the entire ammunition allowance earmarked for the practice.
The specific submarines expended in
the firing by Division 12 are not identified anywhere in reports and logs that
have been consulted. By a process of
elimination, it appears that the three submarines in question were A-4, A-7,
and B-2. Capt. Hart’s report
explicitly associates Division 37’s later firing with both A-3 and A-6,
and thus it seems likely that the three vessels remaining from the four
delivered by Wompatuck on 18 December were the vessels attacked by
Division 37 at about 1330. Assuming the
two “B” boats were held for last, this leaves the three A-4, A-7,
and B-2 as noted for the 1110 firing event. Tug Wompatuck towed these latter three
vessels from
In fairness, however, it needs to be recorded that Roper’s log states that Division 12 fired at A-3 and “A-8” (A-2) at 1111, which would indeed imply a reversal of the two sets of target boats for the 1110 and the 1330 firings. Talbot’s log refers to firing at “B-6” (presumably a corruption of A-6) at 1440 (follow-on to the 1330 event) while Tracy’s log refers to firing at A-4 and A-6 (which are unlikely to ever have been together, based on tug movements) at 1530!
USS Zane. Zane’s log book reports that the destroyer went alongside fleet tug Wompatuck at Mariveles at 1350 on 19 December and took submarines A-5 and A-6 alongside. The destroyer then got underway with the submarines in tow, anchoring at 1400. The subs are noted as still being alongside as of 0400 but subsequent events are unclear. Tug Wompatuck is reported to have gotten underway with one submarine at 0630, and apparently this was one of the vessels moored with Zane. (As noted above in connection with Talbot, the sub removed at 0630 might have been A-5, potentially the unit that was sunk at about 0747.) Zane in turn got underway at 0959, apparently without any submarine in tow for no such note is made, and proceeded to the exercise area.
Zane commenced firing at
1111 and ceased firing at 1115. The ship
returned to
USS Rathburne. Rathburne, Division 12 flagship, got underway at 0955 on 20 December and proceeded with other division units toward the exercise area. Rathburne went to General Quarters for drill at 1005, securing at 1011. At 1100 GQ was set again and the ship commenced the run in toward the submarine targets at 1106. Rathburne opened fire at 1112, ceasing fire at 1115. The destroyers returned to Mariveles harbor, with Rathburne anchoring at 1137.
The ship’s commanding officer later reported the ship’s successful performance: “Fire control and shooting were excellent. The first ranging shot from one gun was 100 yards over; the sight-bar range was immediately lowered 100 yards and salvo fire was opened; the first salvo straddled the ex-submarine and continued to do so until the ex-submarine sank in about 50 seconds”.
Rathburne’s log recorded
that Division 37 got underway from Mariveles harbor at 1200 to participate in
the gunnery exercise. The log further
noted that tug
Rathburne’s log recorded that Division 38 got underway from Mariveles harbor at 1240 to participate in the gunnery exercise.
Rathburne got underway at 1559 as
Division 12, less Dorsey and Talbot, departed Mariveles. Proceeding back to
USS Dorsey. Dorsey got underway at 0953 on 20
December and stood out with Division 12.
The ship set General Quarters at 1103 and commenced firing at 1112. Dorsey ceased fire at 1114 and
recorded that the target was sunk. The
ship anchored at 1135 in Mariveles harbor, remaining there until 1605 when the
ship departed for
Lt. C. Campbell, chief observer, reported that “The Twelfth Division, the Dorsey third ship in column, steamed directly toward the submarine on a westerly course, speed 15 knots. When the range was estimated as 3,500 yards, course was changed 90 degrees to the right to north. It was the intention to open fire with the first section, each vessel at its opposite submarine, when the range was 3,000 yards. The left-hand submarine, which was the Dorsey’s target was considerably closer than the other two, the range-finder reading, which was probably inaccurate, being 1,700 yards when fire was opened. The sight-bar ranges varied from 1,600 yards to 2,000 yards. The Dorsey opened fire at 1112:15, one hundred twentieth meridian east time, sight-bar range 2,000 yards, the submarine bearing 268 (relative), with a one-gun salvo. Nine salvos were fired. Salvos 1 and 4 were of one gun, 3, 7, and 9 were of three guns, and 2, 5, 6, and 8 were of three guns each. Possible hits were made on the third and fifth salvo. At least one and possibly two direct hits were made on eighth salvo, the smoke from the explosion of the shells being plainly visible. This was one minute and 30 seconds after the first shot. The submarine sank stern first at 1114:20, one minute and 58 seconds after the first shot was fired. The sight-bar range for the eighth salvo was 1,800 yards. The patterns were small, possibly about 100 yards”.
Fleet tug
USS Roper. Roper got underway at 0955, forming up in company with the other units of Division 12. Roper went to general quarters at 1105 and the division commenced firing at 1111 at A-3 and “A-8”. The first section ceased fire at 1113. Together with the other units of the Division’s second section, Roper commenced firing with the port side battery at 1115.
Roper was the lead ship of the second section. The ships in the section fired in sequence, spaced by 10 seconds, to allow time to spot individual splashes. Roper’s first salvo consisted of two shots, one each from Nos.2 and 4 guns. According to Lt. Comdr. W.H. Porter, chief observer for this event, “the shot from No.4 was wild and a spot of up 200 yards was applied. The next salvo from No.1 and 2 guns were well placed and appeared to hit the center submarine. From then on until the submarine finally sank at 1118, the pointing and firing was excellent and control good”.
Roper secured from general
Quarters at 1120, having fired 14 rounds.
Roper stood into Mariveles harbor at 1120 and tied up at dock at
1136. Roper got underway at 1540
and proceeded out of
USS Waters. Waters got underway at 0959 on 20 December and joined the Division 12 column as the rear ship, immediately behind Talbot, the vessels steaming in line ahead at 300 yard intervals. The first section of Division 12 arrived on the exercise range at 1112 and fired at the three submarine targets present. Fire ceased at 1119 with the three craft sunk. Division 12 turned at 1120 to return to Mariveles harbor, Waters anchoring at 1135.
The ship’s gunnery officer reported later that “it was the intention of the chief fire control officer to use director fire, but due to not having sufficient roll it was necessary to shift to pointer fire just before opening fire. The sight setting errors on No.1 gun are believed to be due to this, also to the wind interference and the firing of the other ships of the division, which is believed is responsible in a large degree to the other errors in sight setting”.
Waters’ log book recorded
that the new submarine S-15 stood into Mariveles harbor at 1225, but the
boats of Flotilla Three played no part in the demise of their predecessor
undersea boats of the Asiatic Fleet.
Division 12 got underway at 1539, proceeding back to
Division 37 Operations. Division 37, comprising five participating vessels, also fired at three submarine targets. In this case, Capt. Hart’s report on the event identifies two of these three vessels, A-3 and A-6. Review of tug movements with the submarines strongly suggests that A-2 would have been the third unit of this set. A-2 and A-3 both were transferred from tug Wompatuck to destroyer Roper for safety pending transfer to the firing range, while one of the pair (A-5 and A-6) delivered by Wompatuck to Zane at the same time was removed early on the 20th, potentially for the 0733 firing by Talbot.
USS Chandler.
General Quarters was set aboard
USS Southard. Southard, a unit of Division 37, was
anchored in
Southard arrived on the
gunnery range at 1330 and the division commenced firing one minute later.
Southard’s log recorded that
Division 37 stood in at 1420 towards anchorage and hove to at 1500. The division then got underway at 1515 for
USS Hovey. Hovey was anchored in Mariveles harbor on the morning of 20 December. At 0600 Capt. Hart, Comdr. Carmichael, and Lt. Comdr. H.E. Fisher came aboard to observe the practice. Hovey got underway at 0630, twenty minutes behind Talbot, and arrived on the range at 0710. Hovey commenced fire at 0732, recording that the submarine target sank at 0736. Setting standard speed at 15 knots, Hovey proceeded back to Mariveles harbor.
Hovey’s log recorded the
sighting of Division 12 and tuges with submarine targets departing harbor at
0936. An observer party from
Capt. Hart’s board provided a thorough description of the damage incurred by Hovey’s target, A-3, because the vessel remained afloat for about 12 minutes, permitting observers to view the damage at some length. The report reads as follows:
“(a) Two clean holes on side of strength hull nearest firing ship and two holes on opposite side, one of about 1 and a half feet in diameter and the other 8 inches in diameter and of jagged outline. The plating in both cases projected outward, showing that the two shells had exploded within the strength hull.
(b) One clean hole through both sides of forward superstructure plating, showing that the projectile did not burst in this case before passing through.
© Several small holes in after superstructure, possibly caused by fragments from bursts of short shots. The strength hull may possibly have received some damage.”
Hovey then proceeded to
Mariveles until 1524, when course was set for
USS Broome. Broome was anchored in Mariveles harbor early on the morning of 20 December. The ship sent a party of observers to Talbot at 0545. The ship’s log noted the busy comings and goings of Division 12 that morning as Division 37 waited their turn. The ship’s umpire party returned aboard from Talbot at 1145. At 1148, however, a similar party from Rathburne came aboard Broome to observe the forthcoming operations.
Broome got underway at 1200 and joined column with other Division 37 units, Broome being the second ship in the column. Broome commenced fire at 1334 at the three target craft, ceasing fire at 1348. Broome and Alden opened fire at a range of 3,000 yards. Broome fired twenty rounds in three-gun salvos and had “four direct hits observed in target, which sank shortly after [the] end of [the] run”.
Broome stood into Mariveles
harbor at 1450 and the visiting observer party departed at 1515. The ship got underway at 1528 and made for
the firing range. Arriving at 1600, the
ship lay to until 1718, when Comdr. A.W. Carmichael, Construction Corps USN,
came aboard from Talbot en route to Olongapo. Broome proceeded north toward
Olongapo, passing
Division 38 Operations. USS Smith Thompson. Smith Thompson got underway at 1435 on 20 December to participate in the experimental practice against submarine targets. The ship joined the Division 38 column at 1450, proceeding in order Tracy (guide), Borie, John D. Edwards, Barker, and Smith Thompson. Smith Thompson’s log reported that the formation went to full speed at 1537 but returned at 1541 to standard speed (15 knots). The ship commenced fire with Guns Nos.1, 2, and 4 at 1602, the division in column firing against two submarine targets. One submarine was reported to sink at 1603. Smith Thompson ceased fire at 1605, having expended 20 rounds, using SPD 1527 issue powder.
The firing complete, Smith Thompson
went ahead at 1608, setting standard speed at 1701 but heaving to at 1730 to
transfer observers to Talbot.
Disembarking the observing party at 1740, Smith Thompson
went to full speed at 1755 before returning to standard speed, which was noted
by 1840. Smith Thompson
entered
USS Tracy.
As a unit of Division 38,
USS Borie. Borie, a unit of Division 38, got underway at 0602 and proceeded out in company with Talbot. Designated to back up Talbot in firing one on one at the first target of the day, Talbot’s early success left Borie with nothing more to do. Accordingly, Borie returned to Mariveles harbor at anchored there at 0807. The ship sent observers aboard Southard at 0930. At 1230, Borie began preparations to get underway, taking aboard observers from destroyer Zane at 1250. The ship got underway at 1450 and formed column with units of Division 38 to fire at submarine targets. Borie hove to at 1500 and received aboard at 1506 the ship’s own personnel who had served as observers aboard Southard. Borie was underway again at 1515 and rejoined the division formation. The ship went to General Quarters again at 1531 and commenced firing at 1551 at submarine targets. Borie lost a wherry overboard during the firing evolution and ceased fire at 1601.
Borie steamed in toward
another firing event at 1650, commenced fire at 1702 and ceased fire at
1705. The submarine target in question
was reported in the ship’s log to have sunk at 1708. The visting party of observers departed at
1717. Borie joined the division
underway at 1850, taking position astern of
USS John D. Edwards. John D. Edwards got underway at 1445
and joined formation with Division 38, proceeding at 15 knots for the exercise
area. The ship opened fire at 1557:50
and ceased fire at 1600:40. Returning to
standard speed at 1710, the ship made way back toward
Fleet Tug Operations.
Wompatuck’s log records that the ship returned to
Fleet tug
The
Destroyer and fleet tug logs for
late 1921 make occasional mention of operations by
Fleet tugs Wompatuck and
Tug
Submarine A-1 (Target E). Submarine A-1 also was allocated for
service as a target but never was used in this capacity. In view of the vessel’s declining utility,
and the fact of “little prospect of our being able to send her out to the
Philippines in the near future”, the Navy Department directed on 18 July 1912 that
no further modifications or upkeep be expended on the craft save those “as may
be necessary to prevent further deterioration”.
The Bureau of Ordnance commented on 9 January 1913 in its 7th
Endorsement on the above Navy Department direction that the bureau “is
contemplating certain experiments for which A-1 would be particularly
suitable, and if such use is authorized by the Department this vessel can best
be left in her present condition…” The
decision to assign the vessel to target service under Bureau of Ordnance cognizance
was taken on 21 February 1913. The
Division of Material, Navy Department, accordingly directed the material
bureaus on 1 March 1913 to remove equipment and fittings “as may be of value or
applicable for other purposes” prior to the vessel’s transfer “to
The Navy Department directed that
collier Brutus, in overhaul at Charleston Navy Yard, would tow the
submarine to
Brutus had returned to
Hampton Roads on 7 June 1913 from a Mediterranean deployment. The ship proceeded to
With overhaul work complete, Brutus prepared to get underway on 16 August 1913. Tug Sebago arrived alongside at 1020, bringing the “USS Plunger” (according to the entry in the Brutus’ log book) alongside the collier’s starboard side. The collier’s crew prepared an 8-inch towing hawser, which was affixed astern and made fast to the submarine. The tug departed at 1100 and minutes later, at 1110, Brutus went ahead at slow speed and proceeded out of harbor. Once clear of the harbor confines, the tow line was lengthened. Brutus increased engine speed to 35 rpms, increased further to 41 rpms the following day.
The collier’s log recorded on the
18th that the submarine was “listing considerably but making good weather of
it” as the vessels proceeded northward under gentle breezes and clear
skies. Arriving in Hampton Roads on 19
August, the submarine was passed to tug Wahneta for conveyance into Navy
Yard hands. Brutus continued on
independently to Norfolk Navy Yard, subsequently departing on 28 August en
route to
The Navy Department issued a letter
dated 29 August 1913 to the material bureaus and interested operational
commands that A-1 “will hereafter be known as Target E”. In the event, however, over a year passed and
desired tests did not take place. The
Commandant,
The Navy Department ordered on 12 February that the Board of Inspection and Survey appraise the vessel “with a view to her further disposition”. The board appointed for the purpose, headed by Capt. Henry B. Wilson and including Naval Constructor George H. Rock, among others, met aboard the craft at 0900 on 23 February 1915. They filed a report dated 27 February, finding the vessel—which they referred to as A-1 rather than Target E—in good condition but of obsolete type. Accordingly, the board recommended that A-1 “be condemned for sale”.
The Bureau of Ordnance argued anew for employing the ship in target service. That bureau’s first endorsement on the inspection report noted the vessel’s good condition but small scrap value, recommending that the ship could be used profitably as a target: “it might be well to use her for a target for bombs dropped from aeroplanes to ascertain whether or not such attack is feasible and to determine what the character of the bomb should be, to damage submarine vessels, and also this vessel could be used to advantage in connection with the test of submarine protection [not further described] proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet”.
The Bureau of Ordnance reported to
the Material section of the Naval Operations office on 22 August 1916—over a
year later—that air-delivered anti-submarine bombs were being manufactured at
Washington Navy Yard and were “about completed”. The Bureau of Ordnance “planned to conduct
tests in the near future, using the aeroplane now under construction at the
Washington Navy Yard for this purpose.
Upon completion of these preliminary tests the Bureau suggests that
further tests be conducted by the fleet aeroplanes now aboard the
Despite this proposal, nothing was done. Naval Constructor Emory S. Land USN inquired with Norfolk Navy Yard in mid-1917 about the status of the craft. An informal reply dated 12 June 1917 provided an update on the old vessel, as follows:
“Target E (ex-Submarine A-1) is at this yard. She has been lying at the extreme end of “Rotten Row” for several years. She is hard and fast aground, and some difficulty will probably be experienced in getting her off, but it can be done.
“The Board of Inspection and Survey reported on her [on] May 15, 1916, and you may find something of interest in their report.
“Industrial Manager [Norfolk], in his letter No.3001-765, August 17, 1916 recommended that she be disposed of, and the final decision of the Department was given in its letter of August 29, 1916, that she be retained at Norfolk until the Bureau of Ordnance is ready to conduct certain bomb tests from airplanes.
“Undoubtedly, some preparatory work will be necessary to get her ready for any test that would involve her being submerged, but it seems entirely reasonable that she can be used for that purpose unless the other experiment above referred are carried out.”
Armed with this information, the Bureau of Construction and Repair sent a letter to the Bureau of Ordnance dated 16 June 1917, noting the vessel’s deteriorated condition but acknowledging the Navy Department’s August 29 direction to support BuOrd experiments. On that basis, the Bureau of C&R then went on to request that bomb testing include provisions to examine the effects of modern explosives on submarine storage battery cells, electric light installations, animals located inside the target, and overall effects on hull structure. BuOrd replied in a Second Endorsement to the letter, en route to the Navy Department, “strongly” concurring in the construction bureau’s interests in bomb test planning but asking if Target E was “suitable for conducting such experiments”.
The Bureau of Construction and Repair then asked Norfolk Navy Yard to assess the feasibility of using the old submarine for this purpose and, if yes, to make an estimate of the time and cost to prepare the vessel for this new duty. The Industrial Manager, Norfolk Navy Yard replied in a letter dated 18 July 1917, stating “when Target E was stricken from the Navy List, no further expenditures for care and preservation were undertaken. She is now lying partly in the water and partly in the mud, the interior being full of water.” The yard was pessimistic about the readiness of the vessel for target service and observed that it would be “a very expensive matter to put her in condition to submerge and emerge”. It was thought reasonable to use the craft for tests of hull structure, however.
The Bureau of Construction and Repair drafted a reply, recommending that the vessel pumped out and pulled out of the mud for testing bomb explosive effects “at various distances from the hull” in order to evaluate structural strength. The letter apparently was never sent, however, and the war came to an end before any use had been made of Target E.
Postwar, dredging operations encroached on the half-sunken submarine and OpNav lost his patience with the Bureau of Ordnance’s failure to make practical use of the vessel. The Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter dated 1 May 1919 to the Bureau of Ordnance, directing that Target E was “to be removed immediately from its present location by the Navy yard” and “requested” that the Bureau “dispose of this target as soon as possible”. This time BuOrd agreed with disposal and recommended on 5 May that the Navy Department survey the vessel and reappraise it for scrap sale. The Bureau of Construction and Repair, commenting on Buord’s proposal, recommended on 6 May 1919 to the Navy Department that the submarine be towed into deep water and sunk.
At about this time the Navy Yard
provided a 150-ton crane to raise the vessel from the mud and hoisted it on
deck aboard the Target C (ex-monitor Puritan), laid up at the
Mine Depot, St. Juliens Creek, near
The Board observed that the vessel’s structure “is now in such condition as not be suitable for use” but that the considerable volume of bronze and copper aboard would have some value as scrap. The Board reported out on 22 May, recommending that Target E be scrapped. The Bureau of Construction and Repair agreed in the proposal for scrapping on 28 May 1919. The Bureau of Ordnance reversed itself on 2 June, however, arguing yet again that the vessel should instead be employed “as a target for aeroplane bomb dropping with service aeroplane bombs.” The Chief of Naval Operations sided with the Navy yard and the construction bureau, however, directing on 10 June 1919 that Target E be scrapped.
The Navy Department placed Puritan on the list of vessels to be disposed of by sale on 1 July 1921, directing that any equipment of continuing value be removed. In response to a request for information from the Bureau of Ordnance, the Industrial Department, Norfolk Navy Yard reported on 15 July that relatively little ordnance material remained on board:
“The Puritan formerly had 12[-in.]/35 guns and mounts… Actually, in both turrets, the gun girders are intact with elevating transom and deck lugs all made up to the turret pan, but the material is in very poor condition. There are no guns, speed gears, motors, small arms, spare parts, etc., on board.
About amidships there is a section about 35 ft. by 40 ft. made up of 5 thicknesses of 1-1/4-inch plates, probably special treatment steel, set up at an angle for experimental firing. There are two holes and part of the section is dished from gunfire.
The submarine ex-Plunger is on the deck of the Puritan and will be left there to be included as scrap in the sale of the Puritan unless other directions are received from the Bureau.”
A board of Inspection and Appraisal was held to evaluate the status of both Puritan and Target E and that board recommended on 16 August 1921 that both vessels be sold for scrap with no further removal of equipment necessary prior to sale. The Secretary of the Navy approved that finding and directed on 25 August 1921 that both vessels be sold “irrespective of their appraised value”.
Puritan, with Target E
embarked, was sold to Joseph G. Hitner and W.F. Cutler, as part of a lot of
eight large vessels included in a single contract dated 24 Feb. 1922 (
Sources: Navy records at the National Archives,
Braisted, William R. The
Idem., The